Nägemistaju automaatsete protsesside eksperimentaalne uurimine by Põldver, Nele
1
Tartu 2018
ISSN 1024-3291
ISBN 978-9949-77-677-1
N
ELE PÕ
LD
V
ER
 
A
n experim
ental exploration of autom
atic processes in visual perception
NELE PÕLDVER
An experimental exploration of automatic
processes in visual perception
DISSERTATIONES 
PSYCHOLOGICAE 
UNIVERSITATIS 
TARTUENSIS
52
DISSERTATIONES PSYCHOLOGICAE UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 
52 
DISSERTATIONES PSYCHOLOGICAE UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 
52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NELE PÕLDVER 
 
 
An experimental exploration of automatic 
processes in visual perception 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute of Psychology, University of Tartu, Estonia. 
 
This dissertation is accepted for the commencement of the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy (in Psychology) on January 15, 2018 by the Council of the Institute 
of Psychology, University of Tartu. 
 
Supervisors:  Kairi Kreegipuu, PhD 
  University of Tartu, Estonia 
  
 Jüri Allik, PhD 
  University of Tartu, Estonia 
 
 Risto Näätänen, PhD 
  University of Tartu, Estonia 
 
Opponent:  Prof. Dr. Erich Schröger 
 Institute of Psychology 
 University of Leipzig 
 
 
Commencement: March 16, 2018 in Näituse 2, Tartu. 
 
Publication of this thesis is granted by the Institute of Psychology, University of 
Tartu, Estonia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1024-3291 
ISBN 978-9949-77-677-1 (print) 
ISBN 978-9949-77-678-8 (pdf) 
 
Copyright: Nele Põldver, 2018 
 
 
University of Tartu Press 
www.tyk.ee 
5 
CONTENTS 
LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS .......................................................  6 
INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................  7 
Overview of the visual system ..................................................................  7 
Automaticity in visual perception .............................................................  9 
DETECTION OF MOTION ..........................................................................  14 
Relative motion principle revisited ...........................................................  15 
Study I: Reaction time to motion onset and magnitude  
estimation of velocity in the presence of background motion ........  16 
Detecting motion direction changes without the need  
for focal attention ......................................................................................  17 
Study II: Unattended and attended visual change detection  
of motion as indexed by event-related potentials and  
its behavioral correlates ..................................................................  20 
Processing motion information relative to other tasks ..............................  22 
Study III: Visual evoked potentials to change in coloration  
of a moving bar ...............................................................................  23 
PROCESSING EMOTIONAL EXPRESSIONS ...........................................  26 
Study IV: vMMN for schematic faces: automatic detection  
of change in emotional expression ..................................................  29 
VISUAL MISMATCH NEGATIVITY- AN AUTOMATIC CHANGE-
DETECTION MECHANISM ........................................................................  32 
Study V: Visual Mismatch Negativity (vMMN): A review and  
meta-analysis of studies in psychiatric and neurological  
disorders ..........................................................................................  35 
CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................  39 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...........................................................................  41 
REFERENCES ...............................................................................................  43 
EESTIKEELNE KOKKUVÕTE (Summary in Estonian) .............................  55 
PUBLICATIONS ...........................................................................................  61 
CURRICULUM VITAE ................................................................................  148 
ELULOOKIRJELDUS (CV in Estonian) ......................................................  150 
 
6 
LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS 
This dissertation is based on the following original publications, further referred 
to as Studies by respective Roman numerals: 
 
I  Kuldkepp, N., Kreegipuu, K., Raidvee, A., & Allik, J. (2011). Reaction time 
to motion onset and magnitude estimation of velocity in the presence of 
background motion. Vision Research, 51, 1254–1261.  
II Kuldkepp, N., Kreegipuu, K., Raidvee, A., Näätänen, R., & Allik, J. (2013). 
Unattended and attended visual change detection of motion as indexed by 
event-related potentials and its behavioral correlates. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 7:476. 
III Murd, C., Kreegipuu, K., Kuldkepp, N., Raidvee, A., Tamm, M., & Allik, J. 
(2014). Visual evoked potentials to change in coloration of a moving bar. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8:19. 
IV Kreegipuu, K., Kuldkepp, N., Sibolt, O., Toom, M., Allik, J., & Näätänen, R. 
(2013). vMMN for schematic faces: automatic detection of change in 
emotional expression. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7:714. 
V Kremláček, J., Kreegipuu, K., Tales, A., Astikainen, P., Põldver, N., Nää-
tänen, R., & Stephanics, G. (2016). Visual Mismatch Negativity (vMMN): 
A review and meta-analysis of studies in psychiatric and neurological 
disorders. Cortex, 80, 76–112. 
 
 
The author of the present dissertation contributed to these publications as 
follows: 
In Studies I and II, the author participated in formulating the research questions 
and preparing the experimental paradigms, collected and analysed the data, 
interpreted the results, and wrote the manuscripts as the first author. 
In Study III, the author collected the data and participated in interpreting the 
results and writing the manuscript. 
In Study IV, the author participated in formulating the research questions, pre-
paring the experimental paradigm, collecting and interpreting the data, and 
writing the manuscript. 
In Study V, the author participated in initiating the idea of the manuscript, co-
wrote two chapters of the review and participated in correcting and reviewing 
the manuscript. 
7 
INTRODUCTION 
The main function of the visual system is to represent various dimensions of the 
surrounding environment that are relevant for the organism orienting in this 
environment. As the needs and behaviour of organisms evolved and became 
more sophisticated, new dimensions were added to the increasingly complex 
representation of the environment in the visual system. As an example, although 
some ancestors of vertebrates had colour vision – different opsin molecules with 
different absorbance peaks, meaning they had the ability to differentiate bet-
ween colours – this capacity became widespread only among mammals and 
primates (Gehring, 2014). Thus, some visual dimensions appeared earlier and 
some others on later stages of evolution. It is intuitively obvious, for instance, 
that it was more urgent to recognize the movement of something without identi-
fying its exact shape or colour. The architecture and functions of the visual 
system support the idea that some perceptual processes are executed more 
automatically than others are. 
The research presented and discussed in this thesis is an experimental explo-
ration of processes in visual perception, which all display a considerable amount 
of automaticity. These processes are targeted from different angles using dif-
ferent experimental paradigms and stimuli, and by measuring both behavioural 
and brain responses. I will first give a short overview of the structure and func-
tions of the visual system and introduce the concept of automaticity. Then I will 
continue with the topic of motion detection, which is regarded one of the most 
basic processes shaped by evolution. In the first two empirical studies, I will 
investigate the effects of the surrounding environment on the detection of 
motion, as well as show that our visual system is built to automatically process 
motion information that is outside of our attentional focus. After that, I will 
proceed with the study on how sudden changes in coloration of a moving object 
are detected, and address the question of what happens when multiple stimulus 
qualities are present and varied, especially when both of those are rather salient. 
Next, I present evidence indicating that we probably have a module for detecting 
facial expressions quickly and automatically. The roof of this module is based 
on the visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) and presented evidence allows to 
assert that vMMN exists and can be used for studying automatic visual pro-
cesses. Finally, I discuss the cases when the brains’ capability of processing the 
changes in visual input automatically is altered or intact, and show the practical 
value of vMMN. 
 
 
Overview of the visual system 
It was noticed relatively early that different visual attributes are analysed by dif-
ferent parts of the brain. An astonishing progress in our understanding of the 
architecture of the visual system (starting with studying the receptive fields of 
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cortical cells in the middle of the 20th century) identified several streams of 
information, which may be responsible for different perceptual capacities 
(Hubel & Wiesel, 2005). Anatomical and physiological studies indicated that 
there are separate systems for the analysis of colour, stereopsis, movement, and 
orientation in the visual cortex (Livingstone & Hubel, 1987, 1988). This spe-
cialization begins already on lower levels of the visual system, starting from the 
input layer of the eye’s retina with different types of photoreceptors (rods and 
cones, the latter divided into three categories according to their wavelength 
selectivity). The retinal output layer includes anatomically different parasol 
(M), midget (P) and bistratified (K) ganglion cells, which project to different 
cellular layers in the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN). The M cells project to 
the magnocellular layers (layers 1–2), the P cells to the parvocellular layers (3–6), 
the K cells to the interlaminar layers of the LGN1 (Kaplan, 2014). The magno-
cellular pathway is selective for motion and depth information. It is believed to 
have developed earlier, and known to operate faster than the parvocellular 
pathway. The parvocellular pathway is selective to colour (especially red-green 
comparison) and form information. The koniocellular pathway is thought to 
take part in colour processing in mostly the blue-yellow comparison dimension. 
At lower levels, in the retina and in the LGN, cells in these subdivisions differ 
in their colour selectivity, contrast sensitivity, temporal perception, and acuity 
(Livingstone & Hubel, 1988; Kaplan, 2014). The projections of the magno- and 
parvocellular (but also koniocellular) pathways (from the LGN to primary 
visual cortex, V1) function as the initial inputs to different information pro-
cessing streams in the visual cortex. Within those streams, there are feed-
forward, horizontal, and feedback connections (see also p. 33 for a note on 
terminology) (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). 
Clinical observations as well as animal studies have suggested that it might 
be relevant to distinguish between two large cortical information processing 
systems providing “vision for action” (the dorsal stream) and “vision for per-
ception” (the ventral stream) (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Milner & Goodale, 2008; 
Goodale, 2011; Whitwell, Milner, & Goodale, 2014)2. The dorsal stream receives 
mostly magnocellular input – cells from the magnocellular layers of the LGN 
terminate in V1 layers 4Cα and 4B, and project to the posterior parietal cortex 
                                                                          
1  While magno- and parvocellular pathways are excessively studied, less is known about 
the third, koniocellular, pathway, which retinal source supposedly consists of small 
bistratified ganglion cells (color sensitive blue-ON/yellow-OFF cells) projecting to the 
interlaminar layers (or the K layers, sometimes also referred to as the S layers) of the LGN 
(Kaplan, 2014).  
2  The anatomical dorsal and ventral streams have been classically termed as “Where” 
(processing spatial information) and “What” (processing object information) streams, 
respectively (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). Goodale and Milner added the goal-relevancy 
aspect to the dichotomy, redefining the dorsal stream as a “How” system responsible for 
ecocentrically guided action (e.g. grasping something), while the “What” system (ventral 
stream) is responsible for object representations.  
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through visual cortex areas V2, V3 and V5 (also known as MT, middle tem-
poral area). The ventral stream receives input from predominantly parvocellular 
(LGN projections to layer 4Cβ in V1), as well as magno- and koniocellular 
(LGN projections terminating in the upper layers of V1) pathways, and projects 
to inferior temporal cortex through V2 and V4 areas (Livingstone & Hubel, 
1987, 1988; Goodale, 2011; Kaplan, 2014).  
Dorsal and ventral streams have been found to support different compu-
tations involved in vision. For example, it was observed that if a brain ablation 
made an organism unable to identify shapes and patterns visually, these orga-
nisms nevertheless showed a considerable ability to localize objects in space by 
means of vision (Schneider, 1969). It was also noticed that some human patients 
with lesions to their primary visual cortex demonstrated residual visual capacity – 
termed blindsight –, but without acknowledged perceptual awareness (Sanders, 
Warrington, Marshall, & Weiskrantz, 1974; Kentridge, Heywood, & Weisk-
rantz, 1999; Stoerig & Cowey, 1997; Weiskrantz, 1990). This indicates that 
some visual processing occurs outside of or can bypass primary visual cortex 
(see also recent proof on that: Mundinano, Chen, de Souza, Sarossy, Joanisse, 
Goodale, & Bourne, 2017)3, and it can function autonomously without the 
necessary involvement of consciousness or attentional control. One obvious 
generalization from these observations is that awareness and control is not a 
requirement for all visual mechanisms. There may be low-level mechanisms 
that require no attention and control for their execution.  
 
 
Automaticity in visual perception 
The observations about the architecture and functions of the visual system indi-
cate that the visual representation is created by multiple visual mechanisms, 
which differ considerably from one another by their principal characteristics. 
One of these defining characteristics is the level of automaticity of the process. 
Automaticity refers to the ability to do things without occupying one’s mind or 
keeping attention with operations required for the execution of a process. 
Although automaticity may develop in the result of practice, repetitions, and 
training, there are processes that can be executed automatically without any 
deliberate learning or practice. 
In a series of papers, Richard Shiffrin and Walter Schneider advanced a two-
process theory of human information processing (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; 
                                                                          
3  It has been shown that there are different routes bypassing the V1 in the visual system. In 
the main one, related to action (grasping, reaching) and visual attention, signal is 
transformed from the retina to superior colliculus in the midbrain, where information is sent 
to parietal cortex via the pulvinar (in the thalamus) and MT. There are also direct projections 
from the retina to the pulvinar, as well as direct projections from the LGN to MT (Goodale, 
2011; Shipp, 2004). The retina-pulvinar-MT route has recently been shown by Mundinano 
and colleagues (2017) in a case study of a patient with bilateral V1 damage at 9 days of age. 
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Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). First, automatic processing refers to activation of a 
learned sequence of elements in long-term memory that is initiated by appro-
priate inputs and then proceeds automatically. Automatic processing occurs 
quickly, without subject’s control, with little or no capacity limitations of the 
system, without requiring focal attention, is unaffected by task load, and once 
(perceptually) learned, is difficult to alter or stop. Second, controlled processing 
is a temporary activation of a sequence of elements that can also be set up easily 
but demands attention, is usually serial in nature, therefore capacity-limited, and 
is controlled by the subject (Birnboim, 2003; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin 
& Schneider, 1977, 1984). The distinction between automatic and controlled 
processing, although supported by many, has not been convincing to everyone, 
and is debated over outside the field of perception psychology as well (e.g. 
Moors, 2016).  
Many researchers have proposed largely overlapping lists of characteristics 
of automatic processes. Bargh (1994) names the characteristics that usually 
accompany automatic mental processes or behaviour the four horsemen of auto-
maticity – (un)awareness, (un)intentionality, efficiency and (un)controllability.  
1. (Un)awareness: A person may be unaware of the mental processes that are 
occurring. One of the best indicators of awareness is selective attention 
defined as a tendency of visual processing to be confined largely to stimuli 
that are relevant to behaviour (Knudsen, 2007; Moore & Zirnsak, 2017). 
Equally informative are the situations where selective attention is not ope-
rational. A good example is a spontaneous brain response to change 
detection, which was discovered by Risto Näätänen and termed the 
mismatch negativity or MMN (Näätänen, Gaillard, & Mäntysalo, 1978). 
MMN, first studied in auditory modality, is traditionally elicited by a 
discriminable physical change (called a deviant stimulus) in a train of 
frequently presented homogeneous stimuli (called standard stimuli), and 
computable from the brain’s electrophysiological activity as a difference 
between the ERP (event related potential) responses to deviants and standards. 
(See the more thorough overview of the MMN on pp. 18–19) One of the 
most central characteristics of the MMN is its independence from awareness. 
MMN is best elicited when the subject is not attending to the MMN-
generating stimuli, but is engaged in an auxiliary task (in auditory MMN 
experiments often reading a book or watching a silent movie) that consumes 
most of the attention (Duncan, Barry, Connolly, Fischer, Michie, Näätänen 
et al., 2009; Näätänen, Paavilainen, Rinne, & Alho, 2007). There are 
convincing results that MMN is elicited in the brains of very young children 
who have not yet developed skills to control and regulate their psychological 
functions (e.g. Cheour, Alho, Čeponiené, Reinikainen, Sainio, Pohjavuori, et 
al., 1998; Cheour, Martynova, Näätänen, Erkkola, Sillanpää, Kero, et al., 
2002; for a review see Cheour, Leppänen, & Kraus, 2000). Independence of 
awareness is also evident in research showing that the magnitude of the 
MMN is practically the same whether an individual is awake or sleeping, as 
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have been shown on adults (Nashida, Yabe, Sato, Hiruma, Sutoh, Shinozaki, 
& Kaneko, 2000; Sculthorpe, Ouellet, & Campbell, 2009) as well as infants 
(Cheour-Luhtanen, Alho, Kujala, Sainio, Reinikainen, Renlund, et al., 1995; 
Stefanics, Háden, Huotilainen, Balázs, Sziller, Beke, et al., 2007). More 
strikingly, MMN to change detection has been recorded in foetuses pre-birth 
(Huotilainen, Kujala, Hotakainen, Parkkonen, Taulu, Simola, et al., 2005). 
MMN is also elicited in clinical patients with reduced or lacking awareness as 
a predictor of recovery – comatose patients and patients in persistent 
vegetative state (for a review see Näätänen, Kujala, Kreegipuu, Carlson, 
Escera, Baldeweg, & Ponton, 2011). These examples of intact change 
detection processes illustrate that one of the most central characteristic of 
automaticity is the lack of or reduced awareness.  
2. (Un)intentionality: A person may not be involved with the initiation of a 
mental process. A typical means to manipulation is the instruction given in 
experiments. For example, when the instruction is to perform a certain task 
(e.g. detecting a stimulus), the researchers often assume the participants ignore 
some other information simultaneously presented to them. If the participants 
are unable to ignore it, this may indicate that the process of registering infor-
mation is automatic and executed even without intention. Vision researchers 
are familiar with situations in which participants are not able to carry out 
relatively simple tasks although they were instructed to do so. For instance, 
this applies in case of various visual illusions. As an illustrative example, 
Morgan, Hole and Glennerster (1990) presented a modification of the classi-
cal Müller-Lyer illusion (the line appearing to be longer if the end points 
have outgoing arrowheads attached to them, and shorter if the arrowheads 
are ingoing). Instead of presenting the lines, only the end points of the lines 
were marked as dots, each surrounded by a cluster of dots in other colour. In 
the Müller-Lyer illusion spirit, although the target dots were in exact same 
positions in both cases, in one case the clusters were tilted towards the outer 
frame of the screen; in the second case, the clusters were tilted towards the 
centre of the screen. The subjects had to report the distance between the 
black dots. A target dot seemed to be displaced towards the centre of a sur-
rounding cluster of dots, even though it was clearly discriminable from other 
members of the cluster by their colour, resulting in subjects estimating the 
distance between the dots to be shorter, when the clusters were closer to the 
centre of the screen. The authors argue that this is a demonstration of 
constraints upon visual processing, which arise when subjects are instructed 
to carry out a task to which the visual system is not adapted. (Morgan et al., 
1990). This was obviously not an intention of the subjects to report the posi-
tion of the centre of a cloud of dots.  
3. Efficiency or cognitive load: Automatic mental processes tend to have low 
cognitive load, not requiring very demanding mental resources. It is well 
documented that encoding and representing information in short-term memory 
is capacity limited: only a certain amount of information can be stored (Miller, 
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1956; Cowan, 2010, 2015). Automatic processes are supposed to have no 
such limitations and they can easily go beyond limited capacity. A good 
example is the visual pop-out phenomenon, which refers to the situation in 
which a unique visual target can be detected rapidly and effortlessly among a 
set of homogeneous distractors (Treisman & Paterson, 1984; Wolfe, 1994). 
One criterion demonstrating efficiency is the time needed for the execution 
of a task. Unmistakably, mental processes, which require shorter time for their 
execution, are better candidates for automatic processes than those whose 
implementation is more time consuming (Kahneman, 2011). There is con-
siderable amount of evidence suggesting that early visual processing is 
executed with the help of relatively simple and autonomous mechanisms 
(Julesz & Schumer, 1981), even if those perceptual phenomena are divided 
into different processing stages that follow each other. For example, many 
motion perception phenomena such as induced or rotary motion (Proffitt, 
Cutting, & Stier, 1979; Wallach & O’Leary, 1985) to say nothing of bio-
logical motion (Cutting, Proffitt, & Kozlowski, 1978; Johansson, 1973; 
Blake & Shiffrar, 2007) seem to require several stages of computation. 
Gunnar Johansson proposed that first, a vector of the common motion is 
extracted, and then all particular motions are computed relative to that 
(Johansson, 1973, 1978). This means that the computation of one local 
motion vector is put into the context of other motion vectors, which is 
necessary for the determination of absolute motion. Although there seems to 
be at least two simultaneous processes – one for common motion and one for 
relative motion – the minimization of relative motion dominates perception 
for most stimuli (Cutting & Proffitt, 1982). Even though motion perception 
goes through several stages of processing, requires several computations and 
comparison of the results of these computations, it is believed to be largely 
automatic not requiring excessive cognitive load (this is what already 
Johansson, 1973, stated for biological motion). 
4. (Un)controllability: A person may not have the ability to stop or alter a 
mental process or behaviour after initiation. Many perceptual functions are 
organized based on the goal-directed or top-down principles. There is evi-
dence that intraparietal cortex and superior frontal cortex (forming a dorsal 
frontoparietal network) are involved in visual processing modulating selec-
tion and detection of visual stimuli (Carrasco, 2011; Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002). However, some (visual) functions are rather autonomous, stimulus-
driven and cannot be stopped or altered. For instance, it was proposed that 
human and nonhuman animal minds contain an autonomous subcortical 
module, which activates automatically to stimuli that are fear relevant and 
which are relatively impenetrable to cognitive control (Öhman & Mineka, 
2001). Activation of the “fear module” cannot usually be stopped, is rela-
tively unaffected by other cognitive processes, meaning also it does not need 
conscious representation of the fear-inducing stimuli to be initiated.  
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It is reasonable to represent visual processing as a hierarchy of mechanisms 
leading to increasingly complex representations (Hochstein & Ahhisar, 2002). 
At the bottom of this hierarchical system are largely automatic mechanisms, 
which are usually cognitively impenetrable (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). The 
conscious perception begins at a certain stage of the hierarchy and becomes 
dominating at the top. Thus, awareness and controllability become more likely 
on higher stages of the hierarchy of visual mechanisms. As recent studies 
demonstrate, elementary automatic processes may not be entirely different from 
higher cognitive abilities. They often demonstrate a primitive (sensory) intelli-
gence (Näätänen, Tervaniemi, Sussman, Paavilainen, & Winkler, 2001; Näätä-
nen, Astikainen, Ruusuvirta, & Huotilainen, 2010).  
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DETECTION OF MOTION 
Every day walking to the University during rush hour, I have to cross a busy 
street with four lanes that does not have a traffic light. When near it, I direct my 
attention to vehicles approaching from my left on the first lane to estimate their 
velocity and whether they stop, and make a decision to cross or not to cross the 
lane. At the same time, there are vehicles on lane two and a bit further, on the 
last two lanes, coming from the right. As I am still busy crossing the first lane 
and noticing the movement on the second one, I have not yet directed my atten-
tion to the last two lanes, that are further away, but despite that, the movement 
of the vehicles there has been registered by my visual system. When we think 
about the functions motion detection has in the environment – from avoiding to 
become pray in the jungle for our ancestors to orienting in the city jungle 
nowadays –, it is only logical that this process needs to be rather automatic in its 
nature. This is supported by the knowledge of the temporal qualities of the 
neurological mechanisms that are tuned to the detection of motion, described 
even as a “magnocellular advantage” (Laycock, Crewther, & Crewther, 2007). 
For example, the conduction velocity of axons in the magnocellular pathway is 
high compared to the parvocellular pathway (Livingstone & Hubel, 1988; 
Kaplan, 2014). Response latencies of magno- and parvocellular neurons have 
been shown to differ from around 10 ms (measured from the LGN, Maunsell & 
Gibson, 1992) up to 20 ms (measured from V1 layers, Nowak, Munk, Girard, & 
Bullier, 1995; see also Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000, for a meta-analysis on the 
response latencies in visual cortex). However, inferring neural timing of events 
from only response latencies should be addressed with caution. Maunsell and 
colleagues cleverly showed, by using single-unit recordings from both parvo- 
and magnocellular LGN neurons, that although the magnocellular response 
latencies were around 10 ms shorter, this advantage was eliminated when they 
took into account the number of cortical parvo- and magnocellular recipient 
neurons (possibly reflecting the actual input as a result of signal summation) 
(Maunsell, Ghose, Assad, McAdams, Boudreau, & Noerager, 1999).  
In the functional division of the visual cortex, middle temporal area (MT/V5) 
has been shown to be mostly responsible for motion processing (direction and 
movement selective neurons were shown in the corresponding area in rhesus 
monkeys by Zeki, 1974; direction selective neuronal populations in human 
prestriate cortex were shown by Moutoussis & Zeki, 2008). Already the inputs 
from V1 to MT are strongly direction and speed selective, also tuned to bino-
cular disparity (for a review see Born & Bradley, 2005). It has been argued that 
one of the functions of the MT area is to make sense of the surrounding 
environment via segmenting it into centre and surround, which is crucial for 
differentiating figures from grounds, perceiving objects moving, or registering 
the 3D shapes from motion (Tadin, Lappin, Gilroy, & Blake, 2003). Bradley 
and Andersen (1998) used single-cell recordings and showed that the firing 
rates of MT centre-surround neurons increase when the disparity in the surround 
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differs from the disparity in the centre. Thus, MT neurons seem to serve the 
purpose of image segmentation through assessing the salience of at least two 
stimulus qualities – direction and depth (Bradley & Andersen, 1998).  
Many researchers have claimed that our survival depends critically on being 
able to perceive the movement of objects accurately and quickly without 
registering other properties (Palmer, 1999, p. 466). At the same time, our visual 
field is almost constantly filled with different features – edges, colours, objects, 
moving and stationary parts, etc. Although research in visual perception often 
means studying and experimentally manipulating with a single specific visual 
attribute of a stimulus ‒ e.g. orientation, motion, colour, luminance, shape – this 
does not, however reflect the everyday real-life visual input we normally get. 
The perception of one visual attribute does not happen in isolation being depen-
dent on what happens in the neighbouring areas (Gibson, 1950; Johansson, 
1978). The perceptual centre-surround relationship (Nawrot & Sekuler, 1990) 
resembles that in the neuronal level, especially in V5/MT area (Tadin et al., 
2003). Bradley and Andersen have elegantly phrased it: “How do we know, for 
example, when two regions of contrast on the retina correspond to a single 
object or to separate objects? Although colour and texture may vary over diffe-
rent parts of an object or surface, the direction and speed tend to be the same on 
all the parts. Therefore, relative motion is a useful cue for parsing an image into 
its separate components.” (Bradley & Andersen, 1998). 
 
 
Relative motion principle revisited 
It was already Galileo Galilei who denied absolute motion. His famous boat 
example from the “Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems” in 1632 
proposed that to speak about an object we necessarily need to specify a frame of 
reference relative to which we determine all of the object’s displacements 
(Galilei, 1967, a translation by Stillman Drake). When Karl Duncker presented 
his description of the induced movement phenomenon in early 20th century 
(Duncker, 1929, referred in Holmgren, 1973; Cutting & Proffitt, 1982; Wallach, 
O’Leary, & McMahon, 1982; Reinhardt-Rutland, 1988), it was almost agreed 
upon that motion cannot be perceived with no relation to other objects or a 
specified background which serves as a frame of reference. The most common 
example of the induced motion phenomenon is the case where physically 
stationary object is perceived to move in the direction opposite to another 
object, which is moving near the former or surrounding it. This type of a con-
dition is termed also “heterokinesis” (Nawrot & Sekuler, 1990) or “simulta-
neous motion contrast” (Tynan & Sekuler, 1975). An opposite result, where a 
stationary object is perceived to move in the same direction as an inducing 
surround or object, is a phenomenon of motion capture or assimilation (Rama-
chandran, 1987), also referred to as “homokinesis” (Nawrot & Sekuler, 1990). 
Psychophysical and electrophysiological studies have shown that surround 
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moving in the same direction as the target decreases neuronal activity and 
behavioural sensitivity (Ido, Ohtani, & Ejima, 2000). It became a standard theory 
that motion is always perceived relative to some other objects (Gibson, 1950; 
Holmgren, 1973; Johansson, 1978; Wallach et al., 1982). The relativity prin-
ciple of motion perception was later supported by accumulating research. It was 
noticed that beside the object-relative frame of reference the observer can use 
her or his body as a reference for perceived motion. Thus, cues for motion per-
ception can be discriminated into subject-related cues that provide information 
regarding the motion of the object relative to the observer, e.g. her/his retina, 
and relative cues (sometimes referred to as object-relative cues e.g. in Wallach 
et al., 1982) regarding the motion of objects relative to each other (Reinhardt-
Rutland, 1988). See the Introduction of Study I for a more detailed overview on 
relative motion.  
 
 
Study I: Reaction time to motion onset and magnitude estimation  
of velocity in the presence of background motion4 
Study I was designed to address the question of how the presence of motion is 
detected in the company of background motion. Abovementioned previous 
studies seem to suggest that it is difficult or even impossible to ignore the 
background, which serves as an automatic frame of reference relative to which 
the target motion is calculated.  
The stimulus was a sine-wave grating (see Study I Methods section for 
specific parameters) extended to the whole computer screen. A round area in the 
centre of the screen (and in the centre of the visual field) served as a target and 
the subjects’ task was to react to the motion onset of this area (Experiment 1, 
reaction time (RT) being a dependent variable) or estimate on a scale from 1 
(slowest) to 10 (fastest) how fast the target is moving (Experiment 2, velocity 
estimation being a dependent variable). In Experiment 1, we manipulated with 
the size of the target, the size of the gap between target and the background area 
(i.e. no gap versus gap), target and background stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) 
and velocities. In Experiment 2, only the small target size was used, with either 
a gap or no gap separating it from the background, or no background at all. Two 
different conditions for target motion duration were used ‒ fixed (tT = 300 ms) 
and variable duration (tT = VT–2/3, where the slower the stimulus moved, the 
longer it was presented). 
Surprisingly, the results of Study I show no support for the relative motion 
principle. We found that in both experiments, and comparing the RT results 
with the baseline RT results (in case of no moving background), when there was 
a background effect, it seemed to worsen the perception of target motion onset. 
                                                                          
4  This study has been previously published, but viewed from a different angle, in another 
doctoral dissertation: Raidvee, 2012. 
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This resulted in increased reaction times, and in the apparent decrease in the 
perceived velocity as shown by velocity magnitude estimations. These delays 
were even present when the background was moving in the opposite direction 
compared to the target – a situation, which should, as we expected based on the 
relative motion literature, create motion contrast and facilitate the perception of 
target motion. It seems that the observers could ignore the background motion 
for most of the occasions as if it did not exist at all. To put it in the historical 
relative motion terms, it seems that observers can use subject-relative cues – 
most likely their retina – as a stable enough frame of reference relative to which 
object motion is detected. With this task in mind, it is possible at least to some 
extent ignore other displacements or motions even in a close spatial vicinity of 
the target. Thus, the visual system is surprisingly accurate in separation of 
absolute motion – motion relative to human body as a frame of reference – from 
relative motion, which can occur between objects themselves. The results of 
Study I suggest that there seems to be no need for reference to other nearby 
objects, therefore it is very likely that motion detection is more like an auto-
matic process which can be executed without time and energy consuming 
comparisons.  
 
 
Detecting motion direction changes without  
the need for focal attention 
Even if we are deliberately focussed on only a small part of the visual field – 
the velocity of a car approaching, a hole in the pavement to be avoided, faces of 
people on the sidewalk to see whether we know them – the surrounding envi-
ronment is also constantly monitored by the visual system in our brain. While 
these processes are difficult to study via only behavioural reactions, it is 
possible to do so with the help of brain imaging. In the current thesis, the focus 
is on scalp-recorded electroencephalography (EEG) measurements, which are 
non-invasive and relatively easy to acquire, and from which event-related 
potentials (ERPs) – averaged EEG responses that are time-locked to presented 
stimuli – are computed. The latencies of the ERP components and their 
sequence is a track record of the underlying neural activity of stimulus pro-
cessing in milliseconds, therefore with great temporal resolution. ERP ampli-
tudes reflect the amount of cognitive recourses used in processing (Luck, 2012). 
The support for our brain’s ability to automatically register the events outside 
the focus of our attention, that violate regularity, comes from the research 
regarding the ERP component MMN (Näätänen et al., 1978) and its magneto-
encephalographic (MEG) equivalent MMNm (Näätänen, 2001; Tervaniemi, 
Sinkkonen, Virtanen, Kallio, Ilmoniemi, Salonen, & Näätänen, 2005).  
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MMN is an early5 negative-going component amongst cognitive ERPs that 
indicates change detection. Traditionally, it has been determined as a difference 
between the averaged ERP responses to repetitive standard and rare deviant 
events in an oddball-type of stimulus presentation paradigm (the probability of 
deviants in a train of standard stimuli usually not exceeding 20%). However, to 
dissociate MMN from another early and often overlapping N1 component, it 
has been suggested that responses to deviant stimuli from an oddball paradigm 
should be compared to control stimuli from an equiprobable presentation para-
digm (e.g. Jacobsen & Schröger, 2003; Astikainen, Lillstrang, & Ruusuvirta, 
2008; for a review see Kimura, Katayama, Ohira, & Schröger, 2009; for further 
discussion see Kimura, 2012). Also, it has been suggested to compare physi-
cally the same stimuli presented as standards in one series and as deviants in 
another (Stefanics, Csukly, Komlósi, Czobor, & Czigler, 2012).  
The MMN emerges to changes in stimulation in different sensory modalities. 
The most excessive research has been done in auditory modality, where the 
MMN usually peaks between 150–250 ms after the change onset (for aMMN 
reviews see Näätänen et al., 2007; Näätänen, Kujala, Escera, Baldeweg, Kreegi-
puu, Carlson, & Ponton, 2012). There are solid findings also in visual domain 
(for recent vMMN reviews see Kimura, 2012; Stefanics, Kremláček, & Czigler, 
2014), where the latency range has been found to be wider – up to 400 ms 
(Kimura, Schröger, & Czigler, 2011). The vMMN usually has an occipito-
parietal scalp location (for an overview and discussion, see Kimura, 2012), 
frontal components/generators have been less reported (but see examples from 
Study V (Table 1), e.g. Urban, Kremláček, Masopust, & Libiger, 2008, which 
show that the frontal component might be related to several clinical conditions). 
In addition, there is growing evidence in somatosensory (sMMN; Kekoni, 
Hämäläinen, Saarinen, Gröhn, Reinikainen, Lehtokoski, & Näätänen, 1997; 
Shinozaki, Yabe, Sutoh, Hiruma, & Kaneko, 1998; Akatsuka, Wasaka, Nakata, 
Inui, Hoshiyama, & Kakigi, 2005; Restuccia, Zanini, Cazzagon, Del Piero, 
Martucci, & Della Marca, 2009; Strömmer, Tarkka, & Astikainen, 2014; 
Strömmer, Põldver, Waselius, Kirjavainen, Järveläinen, Björksten, Tarkka, & 
Astikainen, 2017) and some in olfactory (oMMN; Krauel, Schott, Sojka, Pause, 
& Ferstl, 1999; Pause & Krauel, 2000; Sabri, Radnovich, Li, & Kareken, 2005) 
modalities. Hence, the MMN has proven to be a general indicator of detecting 
regularity violations, not specific or limited to the processing in the auditory 
cortex. 
                                                                          
5  Sussman and colleagues (Sussman, Chen, Sussman-Fort, & Dinces, 2014) argue that the 
claim “MMN is an early auditory process” should be redefined to “MMN can be elicited 
after attention exerts influence”, since “early” in the MMN field means that MMN emerges 
prior to non-modality-specific attention-related ERP components. On one hand, MMN of 
course peaks quantitatively early (beginning from around 150 ms) if we think about the 
cognitive processes and for example motor execution of behavior. On the other hand, by the 
time of MMN occurring, exogenous brainstem and mid-latency responses have already taken 
place (Luck, 2012).  
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It is important to note, that what is presented as a standard or deviant event, 
is not necessarily defined by a physical change between the stimuli in an 
oddball type of presentation sequence, as was thought in the early days of the 
vMMN research (Pazo-Alvarez, Cadaveira, & Amenedo 2003). It can also be a 
change in a complex stimulus category (for a review of findings in visual 
modality, see Czigler, 2014) as well as a change in an abstract inter-stimulus 
presentation regularity (Stefanics, Kimura, & Czigler, 2011). Risto Näätänen 
with colleagues (Näätänen et al., 2001; Näätänen et al., 2010) have referred to 
the MMN as “primitive intelligence”, as our brain is already on the sensory 
level anticipating what is happening next in a sequence of events, and forming 
complex models of environmental representations. 
Automaticity is one of the key characteristics of the (v)MMN. Knowing that 
motion perception carries high level of automaticity (Cavanagh, 1992), stimuli 
incorporating motion information (e.g. motion direction changes) are an excel-
lent candidate for eliciting the vMMN. Also, it has been proposed that using 
stimuli eliciting dominantly magnocellular pathway activation targets the 
underpinnings of several neurodevelopmental and neuropsychiatric conditions 
(autism, schizophrenia), which rely on the magnocellular-dominated cortical 
feedback projections (Laycock et al., 2007). Therefore, it is somewhat surp-
rising that motion stimuli have not been used more in vMMN research. Before 
Study II was published in 2013, there were nine papers, all but one from two 
different research groups, investigating motion direction changes in visual odd-
ball paradigms. The studies incorporating healthy participants all showed that 
vMMN was elicited to motion direction changes (Pazo-Alvarez, Amenedo, & 
Cadaveira, 2004; Pazo-Alvarez, Amenedo, Lorenzo-López, & Cadaveira, 2004; 
Kremláček, Kubová, Kuba, & Langrová, 2006; Amenedo, Pazo-Alvarez, & 
Cadaveira, 2007). The same can be concluded if we look at the control group 
results from the next studies that used motion-elicited vMMN in special popu-
lations. These studies also reported vMMN deficits in schizophrenia (Urban et 
al., 2008), longer duration metamphetamine abuse (Hosák, Kremláček, Kuba, 
Libiger, & Čížek, 2008), developmental dyslexia (Wang, Bi, Gao, & Wydell, 
2010), aging (Lorenzo-López, Amenedo, Pazo-Alvarez, & Cadaveira, 2004), 
and no pathological vMMN in spinocelebellar ataxia type 2 (SCA2, Kremláček, 
Vališ, Masopust, Urban, Zumrová, Taláb, et al., 2011). The results of the last 
mentioned studies are discussed in detail in Study V. Since 2013, there are three 
additional papers using very different paradigms. In one of them vMMN emerged 
and was shown to be independent of attentional manipulation (expansion-
contrasting direction change in radial motion as a deviant, Kremláček, Kuba, 
Kubová, Langrová, Szanyi, Vít, & Bednář, 2013); in another, vMMN to peri-
pherally presented motion stimuli did not emerge on ERP level, although 
deviance detection was indicated by visual mismatch oscillatory response 
(vMOR, Tugin, Hernandez-Pavon, Ilmoniemi, & Nikulin, 2016). The third 
study, with using saccade and fMRI measurements, differentiated between early 
(up to 150 ms) and late (150–250 ms) deviance detection, where the degree of 
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mismatch between predicted and incoming events is mainly processed at the 
later stage (Malekshahi, Seth, Papanikolaou, Mathews, Birbaumer, Verschure, 
& Caria, 2016).  
 
 
Study II: Unattended and attended visual change detection  
of motion as indexed by event-related potentials and  
its behavioral correlates 
In Study II, we addressed the question of how motion information is processed 
under two different attentional conditions – either without direct focal attention 
or while attended. We presented a novel continuous whole-display experimental 
setup for eliciting the vMMN, where horizontal motion direction change of a 
grating (with the same parameters as in Study I) in the (peripheral) background 
area was a deviant. Similar gratings (but not extended to the whole screen) have 
been previously used in vMMN research as both stationary (van Rhijn, Roeber, 
& O’Shea, 2013) or moving (Kremláček et al., 2006; Hosák et al., 2008; Urban 
et al., 2008; Kremláček et al., 2011). Presenting stimuli across the whole visual 
field is ecologically more valid than presenting one or a few stimuli alone, usually 
without a background, since the former situation is something we naturally 
experience in everyday situations. The specific stimulus configuration of Study 
II was prepared based on the results of Study I, where we showed that the beha-
vioural reactions to the central (target) area were least affected by the peripheral 
background if the target was large and clearly separated from the background 
(condition D in Study I). In this way we could create a situation where the back-
ground could be ignored by the subject, when he or she was directing attention 
only to the central target area, performing a demanding task of reacting to motion 
onset there (“Ignore” condition in Study II). To be reminded, one of the charac-
teristics of the (v)MMN is its independency of attention. Näätänen and col-
leagues (Näätänen et al., 2007) emphasize that MMN is best elicited in case of 
directing attention away from MMN-eliciting stimuli, while it also emerges (but 
with attenuated amplitudes) in case of attention. Attention-related components 
can interfere with the emergence of the MMN component (Sussman, 2007; 
Stefanics et al., 2014). Interestingly, only a few studies directly compare attended 
or unattended conditions, or conditions with different task load (which is related 
to the amount of attention possibly available for the task-irrelevant stimulus 
detection) in vMMN paradigms. For example, Berti (2011) showed that vMMN 
is equally elicited under attention, as well as in the latency range of the atten-
tional blink (the emergence of attentional blink was confirmed by behavioural 
detection task). Another study presented the vMMN eliciting sequences in the 
binocular rivalry paradigm, showing similar vMMNs under different attention 
conditions (van Rhijn et al., 2013). Pazo-Alvarez and colleagues (2004) and 
Kremláček and colleagues (2013) showed no task difficulty effect on vMMN; 
however, Kimura and Takeda (2013) found a vMMN latency delay with the 
21 
increase in task difficulty (but no effect on the vMMN amplitude). Therefore, as 
a comparison, we also presented an attention demanding condition (“Attend” 
condition) in Study II. The subject was asked to attend to both areas of the 
screen – central target and peripheral background – and evaluate whether their 
motion directions are the same or opposite. All subjects were presented with 
both experimental conditions. We recorded the subjects’ EEG (see the details of 
EEG measurement and data analysis in the Methods section of Study II), as well 
as registered their manual reactions (RT-s) to the target motion. 
The EEG results on 40 subjects showed two posterior vMMN components in 
the “Ignore” condition – one reflecting early deviance detection (peaking in 125–
150 ms latency in occipital and 150–175 ms latency in parietal areas) and 
another emerging from 250 ms post-stimulus. There was only a later posterior 
vMMN component for the “Attend” condition, starting from 275 ms post-
stimulus, plus a positivity in Frontal region, that possibly reflects P3 and 
attention-related task-activity. Task relevance seems to interfere with the early 
deviance detection. As we discuss in Study II: “The fact that an early vMMN is 
not seen in “Attend” condition might reflect the executive attention process in 
visual modality. When the features of standard and deviant stimuli (i.e. motion 
direction) are actively processed for conducting a difficult primary task (as was 
the case in our experiment), the visual top-down attention might suppress the 
automatic change-detection mechanism responsible for the emergence of 
vMMN.” (Kuldkepp, Kreegipuu, Raidvee, Näätänen, & Allik, 2013). There is 
also a possible overlap with the MMN and another negative-going component 
N2b that is evoked by active deviance detection (Sussman, 2007).  
The behavioural results showed that in the “Ignore” condition, there is no 
difference between participants’ RT-s during standard (266.5 (SD = 115.2) ms) 
or deviant (258.5 (SD = 121.5) ms) background motion: F(1, 1241) = 0.78,  
p = .38. What is of importance here, is that the behavioural results are un-
affected although the brain registers the changes happening in the background 
motion direction, as shown by the emergence of the vMMN. In the “Attend” 
condition, a deviant event in the background facilitated faster incorrect direction 
estimations which can be explained by the arousal from motivationally signi-
ficant stimuli and quicker orienting response (see the discussion on that in 
Study II). 
The results of Study II strongly support the notion that motion processing is 
automatic. Detecting regularity violations in motion direction was quick (as 
indicated by the vMMN waveform first peaking around 150 ms after stimulus 
onset), uncontrollable, unintentional (as target events appeared in a different 
time-sequence with standard and deviant events), did not require focal attention 
and required little cognitive load, since we registered vMMN concurrently with 
a demanding behavioural task. Changes in the nervous system preceed the 
changes manifested in behaviour, as shown by even a simple comparison between 
the response latencies of visual stimulation in the cortex (Lamme & Roelfsema, 
2000) and the response times from various psychophysical experiments (Tovée, 
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1994), including the behavioural measurements presented in the studies of the 
current thesis. This means that in everyday situations we can easily go on with 
whatever we are doing, only to know that the surroundings are under constant 
monitoring, and that whenever needed, we can quickly react. 
 
 
Processing motion information relative to other tasks 
In Study I, we dealt with changing the spatial relationship between the target 
stimulus and its surrounding area, while they both had similar stimulus 
qualities. We found no relative motion effect, indicating that target motion was 
automatically processed despite of what happened in near vicinity. What 
happens when we attend to, or predict something to happen to one quality of a 
stimulus, but another quality of that same stimulus is present or changing as 
well? This is of utmost interest especially in case of such stimulus attributes that 
are supposed to be dominantly processed by different pathways in the visual 
system – i.e. motion information in the magnocellular, colour in the parvo-
cellular pathway (although such completely discrete dissociations obviously 
cannot be done).  
Researchers have been influenced by and attracted to discoveries of multiple 
visual areas each of which is specialized for processing particular stimulus attri-
butes (Maunsell & van Essen, 1983; Livingstone & Hubel, 1987, 1988; Zeki, 
Watson, Lueck, Friston, Kennard, & Frackowiak, 1991; Grill-Spector & Malach, 
2004; Orban, Van Essen, & Vanduffel, 2004; Wandell, Brewer, & Dougherty, 
2005; Tobimatsu & Celesia, 2006). For example, areas coding various attributes 
of colour in macaque extrastriate cortex were found to be insensitive to direction 
(Conway, Moeller, & Tsao, 2007), while direction selective neurons have been 
found in high concentration in area V5/MT (Zeki, 1974; Born & Bradley, 
2005). Supposing that different visual areas have different activity time courses, 
Semir Zeki conjectured that it would be possible to find visual demonstrations 
showing disparity between visual delays. For example, if an object alters its 
colour and motion direction at the same time, the onset of these two changes 
may not be perceived as simultaneous (Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997, 2008; Lo & 
Zeki, 2014). A perceptual advantage for colour change has been extensively 
reported (e.g. Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997, see Murd, 2014 for a longer overview). 
The whole logic behind Zeki’s experiment is based on an assumption that 
motion and colour are processed by two separate sets of neurons, which are 
essentially uninformed about the results of the other processing unit (Zeki et al., 
1991; Lo & Zeki, 2014; Moutoussis & Zeki, 2008). However, the picture is not 
as clear-cut. It seems that motion information can interfere with colour pro-
cessing, but it is related to velocity, stimulus type and also type of the task 
(Werner, 2007; Murd, 2014). More recently, it has been shown with human 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) using stimuli that change their 
colour or motion that an unexpected change in one feature renders the whole 
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object unexpected, meaning the predictive coding of anticipated independent 
features spreads to other features (Jiang, Summerfield, & Egner, 2016). 
Logothetis and Wandell (2004) argue that although the dominating neurons in 
cortical areas V4 (that is predominantly associated with colour processing) and 
V5 (associated with motion processing) may deliver long-range signals respon-
sible for representing different stimulus features, these areas are also heavily 
interconnected. This means that activity in one area may modulate the sensi-
tivity of the other. This also explains the discrepancies between the results of 
single-cell recordings and fMRI blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal 
measurements, since single-cell recordings mostly focus on one brain area, and 
modulatory activity between different areas cannot be shown under those 
circumstances (Logothetis & Wandell, 2004). 
Although it has been almost a dogma for a while that most visual attributes 
are processed separately, it is theoretically and even technically impossible to 
abstract one attribute completely from all other visual attributes. It is more 
likely that there is an exchange of information when two or more visual attri-
butes are processed at the same time. For instance, if a moving object was to 
change its colouration, it is impossible to imagine that the colour system has no 
information about the constantly changing position of the object. Therefore, it is 
informative to study the processing of one visual attribute in relation of 
processing some other visual attribute. Study III was designed to investigate 
how the processing of different visual attributes is automatically or deliberately 
combined6.  
 
 
Study III: Visual evoked potentials to change in coloration  
of a moving bar 
In Study III, we presented a setup where subjects were instructed to detect a 
colour change in stationary or a (slow or fast) moving stimulus. The colour 
change happened in a different location in each trial (in one of 10 possible 
locations in the middle third of the screen). This was partly a replication of a 
previous study conducted in our laboratory where it was demonstrated that the 
detection in change of colouration is not independent of the movement para-
meters of the stimulus (Kreegipuu, Murd, & Allik, 2006). However, in addition 
to reaction time, we also recorded visual evoked potentials (VEPs) to colour 
changes (for further details of measurement and data analysis see the Methods 
section of Study III). We showed again (as did Kreegipuu et al., 2006), that it 
takes less time to detect the change in the object’s coloration when the object is 
                                                                          
6  Study III was a part of series of studies conducted in our laboratory investigating the 
effect motion has on perceiving other features of a stimulus. These studies as well as a more 
thorough overview on the literature concerning color and motion processing are summarized 
in a recent doctoral thesis (Murd, 2014) and will not be rewritten in the current thesis. Note 
also that Study III was included in the abovementioned doctoral dissertation. 
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moving, especially when the speed of motion is fast. These findings are not in 
accordance with the findings of preferential processing of colour over motion. 
The facilitation effect motion has on a colour-related task has been found in 
other studies, e.g. improving colour constancy (Werner, 2007). Werner conc-
luded, and this is a plausible explanation for the results of Study III as well, that 
even when attention is directed to a colour-related task, motion is a highly 
salient feature that captures attention and activates a high-level motion system 
(Cavanagh, 1992) that influences colour processes.  
There was also an effect of the position of the colour change, resulting in 
shorter RTs when the change took place at later positions along the movement 
trajectory. This means that when a stimulus was visible for a longer duration, 
the response was more effectively executed, which might reflect less uncer-
tainty of the observed event. This is in line with the theory of normalization 
long known from vision perception (e.g. Sekuler, Sekuler, & Sekuler, 1990). 
Sekuler and colleagues showed shorter reaction times in longer viewing periods 
(starting from around 500 ms). They concluded that after a certain integration 
time (in their results it was 500–700 ms, but other integration periods, likely 
dependent on stimulus parameters, have been found, see Sekuler et al., 1990 for 
references), a change in the stimulus motion direction is normalized to motion 
onset. This theory also explains why on short stimulus presentation periods, 
detecting changes takes longer time than detecting onsets. It seems that this 
normalization process is not limited to only directional changes in the visual 
stimulus, but could also explain the findings in Study III, where overcoming the 
uncertainty of the colour change happens in the later positions of the movement 
trajectory. 
The effect of motion on the RT results in Study III was also reflected in the 
VEP results. Interestingly, the amplitude of VEPs (except for N1) elicited by 
the colour change of a faster moving object were reduced compared to changes 
of slower moving and stationary objects. This is not what we initially expected 
(see the Introduction of Study III). We have outlined several possible expla-
nations for such results (see the Discussion section of Study III), one of them 
being that different pathways (parvo- and magnocellular) organised into ventral 
and dorsal cortical streams are differently observable (with possible overlapping 
confounds) through brain electrical potentials. It has for example been argued 
that even when motion-onset VEPs are under investigation, the emerging P1 
peak could reflect pattern-related changes and parvocellular system activity 
instead (Kuba, Kubová, Kremláček, & Langrová, 2007). Different cortical 
processes can be recorded with different accuracy by the VEPs (Tobimatsu & 
Celesia, 2006). For instance, seeing motion onset results in more pronounced 
synchronized activity of several subpopulations of direction-selective neurons, 
manifested in a more pronounced N2 VEP, than in case of motion reversal 
(Henning, Merboldt, & Frahm, 2005). 
The disharmony between behavioural and physiological data is not entirely 
unusual. One of the explanations for the discrepancy between the behavioural 
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and psychophysiological results could rise from the fMRI experiments. For 
example, it has been shown that the BOLD signal that has been found to be 
proportionally related to neuronal activity (Logothetis & Wandell, 2004) is not 
necessarily in accordance with behavioural responses, i.e. what the observers 
subjectively perceive in a visual scene (e.g. Whitney, Goltz, Thomas, Gati, 
Menon, & Goodale, 2003). A higher mean BOLD signal accompanies the dif-
ficulty of the task requiring more processing resources over time, reflected in 
the cumulative activity (e.g. in increasing working memory load, Nyberg, 
Dahlin, Stigsdotter Neely, & Bäckman, 2009). Weaker mean BOLD signal, in 
turn, might indicate that less processing resources are necessary for a task that is 
easier. Changes in the neural level as a function of task difficulty are good 
criteria for evaluating the efficiency (and hence automaticity) of a perceptual 
process. In the context of our results, which showed shorter reaction times (i.e. 
more effective or easy detection) to faster moving stimulus, this might explain 
the discrepancies with the diminished VEP amplitudes. It is also possible that 
certain stimulus aspects are represented in the brain responses but the observers 
do not have awareness of or cognitive access to these brain representations. This 
is supported by the results of Study II (“Ignore” condition) as well, which 
showed that the events that are registered and processed by our visual system 
(as indicated by the EEG results) do not necessarily yield changes in behaviour.  
An important lesson provided by Study III is that although participants were 
asked to register only changes in the target’s colouration (i.e. ignoring the target 
motion) it was very difficult to fully follow this instruction. The observer’s 
inability to follow exactly the given instruction is usually a sign of involuntary 
and automatic processes. Target velocity determined nevertheless the time 
required to detect the change in colour, which further supports the idea that the 
visual system does not process object’s features independently, but uses the 
information about one feature to predict events in another. Such results disprove 
the underlying assumption that colour and motion are processed in two different 
areas, which do not exchange information between each other. Rather the results 
of this study indicate that the detection mechanism considers the target motion 
even if it is irrelevant to the task that was given. 
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PROCESSING EMOTIONAL EXPRESSIONS 
In the previous sections we saw that visual motion detection is a highly auto-
matic process, even affecting the detection of other features like colour change 
in Study III. The importance of motion detection obviously has its roots in evo-
lution, as it is crucial for survival; therefore, we have automatic and cognitively 
impenetrable mechanisms for doing this job. But moving objects are clearly not 
the only input that might signal behaviourally important information (e.g. threat, 
but why not also pleasant outcomes) – humans are social animals and have 
developed similarly automatic processes for the perception of other stimuli such 
as faces, including facial expressions of emotion. It is the expressional quality 
that is most likely causing the preferential processing of faces (Palermo & 
Rhodes, 2007). 
Face detection is a quick and automatic process. Electrophysiological 
measurements allow assessing that with a very precise temporal resolution. The 
categorization if a stimulus is or is not a face happens already in the first 
100 milliseconds after stimulus onset, as has been shown with human MEG and 
ERP recordings and animal single-unit recordings. Also, differentiating if a face 
carries emotional information, and whether that information has a positive or 
negative valence, can happen already around 100 ms (see Palermo & Rhodes, 
2007, for an overview). As a comparison with other stimulus categories, Pegna 
and colleagues showed that while face-related significant ERP activity started 
already at 100 ms, activity related to objects and words started around 180–
200 ms, which is considerably later (Pegna, Khateb, Michel, & Landis, 2004). It 
has been determined that there even exists a specific ERP component – N170 – 
that is sensitive to face-stimuli (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 
1996; note that N170 is also sensitive to bodies, see e.g. Hietanen & Nummen-
maa, 2011). This appears to be the time range where information about the 
specific identity of a face can already be extracted. 
Without going into much detail about the evolution of emotion expressions 
(see e.g. Shariff & Tracy, 2011 for a longer discussion on that), I bring out that 
many current theorists support the “two-stage model” of the evolution of 
emotional expressions. This idea has its roots already in Charles Darwin’s “The 
Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals” originally published in 1872 
(2013)7. In the two-stage view, emotional expressions have two functions8 – 
                                                                          
7  It must be noted, though, that Darwin himself (although it has been falsely attributed to 
him) did not consider expressions to be adaptive or carry communicative meaning. Rather he 
thought that emotional expressions are vestiges from once useful gestures associated and 
practiced with emotions that now have no use, but still keep appearing with those said 
emotions.  
8  Barrett (2011) argues, that emotional expressions might not carry a signaling value (more 
in line also with Darwin’s original ideas), but instead are socially learned symbols. This 
notion is also supported by studies on congenitally blind subjects, who display only a limited 
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first, they evolved to prepare the organism for reacting adaptively by eliciting a 
series of physiological responses (e.g. widening the eyes in case of surprise to 
see the surprise-inducing stimulus better); second, in a later stage, they deve-
loped to provide the means for social communication, by both expressing the 
emotions/intentions and interpreting those of others (Shariff & Tracy, 2011; 
Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). Emotional expressions are not restricted 
to human species (think about an angry dog uncovering its fangs for example), 
which speaks for their important communicative role.  
Taking the evolutional significance of survival into account, it seems to be 
only logical that threat-inducing signals, including threatening faces, are prefe-
rentially processed and elicit a sympathetic autonomous response and mobilise 
the organism for an appropriate behaviour (in a very robust approach, either 
fight or flight, as stated by Walter Cannon already in 1930’s). Threat-inducing 
signals are associated mostly with fear, anger, and disgust amongst basic 
emotional expressions (Ekman, 1999). Seeing a fearful face signals us that there 
is a source of danger in the surrounding environment; disgust might give infor-
mation about, for example, inedible and contaminated food; an angry face could 
mean a potential verbal or physical attack to us. The threat/anger superiority 
hypothesis (orienting attention preferentially to facial gestures that signal threat) 
in detecting emotional faces was formulated already thirty years ago (Hansen & 
Hansen, 1988)9 and has been supported by a large number of empirical studies 
(see Lundqvist, Juth, & Öhman, 2014 for references on experiments using the 
visual search paradigm; Stefanics et al., 2012, as an example of the negativity 
bias from the vMMN field). It has also been shown to persist even if the whole-
face upright configuration is missing – in case of only presenting eyes (with 
eyebrows) as stimuli (Fox & Damjanovic, 2006), in case of inverted faces 
(Öhman et al., 2001; but opposite results are also found, e.g. Tanaka & Farah, 
1993; Fox & Damjanovic, 2006; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008), or even when 
only low-level features such as V shapes (resembling eyebrows in such a 
direction that are considered to signal threat) are presented (Larson, Aronoff, & 
Stearns, 2007; Larson, Aronoff, Sarinopoulos, & Zhu, 2009). However, there 
are opposite results, as for example Weymar and colleagues showed that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
repertoire of facial expressions. However, even the learned symbolic communication is 
evolutionally significant, as it seems to serve the purpose of perceiving the intentions of 
other members of the species.  
9  Interestingly, although Hansen and Hansen’s work is thought of as one of the pioneer 
studies supporting the angry superiority in face detection (an angry face popping out among 
happy ones faster than vice versa), it has later been criticized for being methodologically 
challenged. Purcell and colleagues argued that Hansen and Hansen, while modifying the 
original Ekman and Friesen emotional expression stimuli, created several contrast artifacts 
(e.g. dark or light blobs attracting more attention) that account for their results (Purcell, 
Stewart, & Skov, 1996). By using the same Ekman and Friesen pictures in an original 
grayscale version, Purcell and colleagues found that happy faces were found faster in angry 
crowds, and that the processing appeared to be serial. 
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threat advantage (as indicated by a larger N2pc ERP component amplitude 
related to spatial selective attention) emerges only to the whole-face configu-
ration in the angry-happy schematic face comparisons, not to “eyes with eye-
brows” or “eyebrows only” stimuli (Weymar, Löw, Öhman, & Hamm, 2011). 
On one hand, this is in line with the notion that faces are holistically processed 
(Tanaka & Farah, 1993). On the other, the results showing also preferential pro-
cessing of certain extracted parts of a face that might convey emotional meaning, 
speak in favour of a more general system that is tuned to detecting various 
threat-inducing input, not only faces. One of the promising approaches to the 
mechanisms of how threatening stimuli – including for example, angry faces – 
are preferentially, quickly and automatically processed, proposes a “module of 
fear”, a subcortical rapid information processing route to amygdala (Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001; Öhman, 2002).  
However appealing (with the backup by a vast amount of research) the idea 
of angry/threat superiority might seem, there is also much research speaking in 
favour of detecting happy (i.e. not fear-eliciting) stimuli faster and/or better than 
angry or fearful targets (e.g. Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson, & Öhman, 2005; Calvo 
& Nummenmaa, 2008 (showing also that sad expressions were most poorly 
detected); Becker, Anderson, Mortensen, Neufeld, & Neel, 2011). The happy 
face advantage probably has communicative importance, signalling social cues 
for acceptance and affiliation (Becker et al., 2011). One of the explanations for 
the heterogeneous results on either angry or happy superiority in face detection 
differentiates between emotional and perceptual factors contributing to prefe-
rential processing of stimuli (e.g. Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008). In this view, it 
is not necessarily the affective meaning that is automatically differentiated in 
faces, but specific physical features are faster processed than others are because 
of their distinctiveness. Calvo and Nummenmaa (2008) for example argue that 
the happy face is more visually salient, because of the distinctive features 
(especially in the mouth region), resulting in shorter detection times, and only 
after that, decisions about stimulus identity can be made. However, perceptual 
factors alone cannot account for the processing of emotional faces; there is also 
much research supporting the dominating role of emotional, not perceptual 
factors (see the discussion on that and references in Lundqvist et al., 2014). For 
example, Becker and colleagues showed that happy faces were detected better 
than angry ones even when the former were smiling with closed lips (as opposed 
to the classical Ekman and Friesen face pictures where the preferential detection 
of happy faces could be due to the exposed white teeth) and even when the 
lower half of the face was removed (Becker et al., 2011). It is worth noting that 
the threatening face processing advantage in a visual search task seems to become 
more unstable with stimuli other than schematic faces (Juth et al., 2005; 
Lundqvist et al., 2014). The negativity bias is also dependent on task type – for 
example while visual search tasks, where detecting negative expressions is a 
task, usually report it (Lundqvist et al., 2014; Carretié, 2014), categorization tasks 
show that negative expressions are more slowly and less accurately categorized 
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(see the overview on that in Schlaghecken, Blagrove, Mantantzis, Maylor, & 
Watson, 2017). Also, as a recent review and meta-analysis on exogenous 
attention experiments with emotional stimuli (including faces) showed, although 
over 90% of the reviewed studies found the negativity bias, only under half of 
those presented positive stimuli as well (Carretié, 2014). Such counterbalancing 
is, however, necessary, to say something about the valence effects. Recently, 
Lundqvist and colleagues proposed (backing it up with re-analysing their own 
previously published data, as well as available data from other research groups) 
that the discrepancies found in whether threat inducing or non-inducing stimuli 
are preferentially processed, might be explained by the arousal value of emotional 
stimuli, instead of only their valence (Lundqvist et al., 2014). The arousal 
elicited by positive or negative faces could be in the same magnitude, even if 
the detection task results show different positive-negative valence and attention 
relationships. This has also received support in the meta-analysis of Carretié 
(2014), who reports more arousing positive pictorial stimuli (i.e. with sexual 
content) contributing to the positivity bias. Research regarding ERP responses 
to affective pictorial stimuli (not specifically faces) have also shown the different 
effects the two categories – valence and arousal – have on ERPs (for a review 
see Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008). Valence effects, thought to 
represent automatic selective attention capture in case of salient stimuli, are 
present in earlier ERP latencies (100–250 ms), while arousal influences late(r) 
ERP components (starting from 200 ms post-stimulus, including P300) which 
indicates automatic attention to motivational stimuli that serves the subsequent 
memory encoding (Olofsson et al., 2008).  
Knowing that information about emotional expressions is analysed quickly 
in a rather effortless manner (for example, detecting emotional faces among 
non-emotional), and having a tool (i.e. the vMMN) that allows to study early 
change detection, it seems only logical to combine the two in studying auto-
matic processing.  
 
 
Study IV: vMMN for schematic faces: automatic detection  
of change in emotional expression 
Study IV addressed the question of automatic detection (indicated by the vMMN) 
of emotional content. We used emotional schematic faces (neutral, angry, happy) 
in two different visual MMN paradigms – “classical” oddball and an optimal (or 
optimum) multi-feature paradigm (Näätänen, Pakarinen, Rinne, & Takegata, 
2004). Schematic faces as stimuli have been shown to have high ecological 
validity (Öhman et al., 2001; Lundqvist et al., 2014), and are easily controllable 
with for example no gender or age attributes, or low level perceptual artefacts as 
confounding variables.  
Based on previous studies which demonstrated that threatening facial expres-
sions can be detected faster and before other expressions (Hansen & Hansen, 
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1988; Öhman et al., 2001; Schupp, Öhman, Junghöfer, Weike, Stockburger, & 
Hamm, 2004), we initially proposed that our brain is more ready to form an 
internal model of a fear-inducing, i.e. angry, stimulus. Because the MMN 
technique is based on the idea that our brain is building such models (see the 
more thorough insight into that on pp. 33–34 of the current thesis), which help 
us automatically process environmental information, we expected that angry 
(i.e. possibly fear-inducing) expression has a special status reflected in the 
MMN signals. Recently, Kovarski and colleagues provided a compact overview 
of the vMMN studies using facial expressions as stimuli (Kovarski, Latinus, 
Charpentier, Cléry, Roux, Houy-Durand et al., 2017). Interestingly, in the 
vMMN field, more research has been done with fearful and even sad negative 
stimuli than angry ones (see Table 1 in Kovarski et al., 2017), which makes 
Study IV especially valuable. 
In addition, one of the explorative aims of Study IV was to compare the 
“classical” oddball vMMN paradigm with the optimal (or optimum) multi-
feature paradigm in a within-subjects experimental design that had never been 
done before in the visual domain. Importantly, this was the first vMMN study 
using an optimum paradigm (although there were studies using two deviant 
stimuli presented equiprobably, see the Introduction of Study IV for more 
details). Four conditions with 85% standard stimuli (S), 12.5% deviant stimuli 
(D) and 12.5% target stimuli (scrambled “face”, i.e. a non-face object) were 
presented in the oddball experiment: a) neutral S, angry D, b) neutral S, happy 
D, c) angry S, neutral D, d) happy S, neutral D. In the optimum experiment, 
three conditions were used, each featuring a different standard (either neutral, 
happy or angry) and other stimuli (including their inverted versions, as well as S 
presented as a deviant, and an inverted version of a S, not analysed in the Study) 
presented as deviants, as well as 12.5% non-face targets. Note that the con-
ditions were counterbalanced in both experiments. Behavioural measurements 
included manual RT-s to target detection (showing high performance of the 
subjects in both experiments) as well as a post-experiment questionnaire, where 
the subjects rated the valence, arousal and attention-capture of stimuli, labelled 
them and rated their strategy.  
The main results of Study IV showed that emotional stimuli (regardless of 
their valence) were preferentially processed in the occipital and parietal scalp 
locations compared to the neutral ones, confirming that emotion information is 
extracted from stimulus configurations relatively fast and without the need for 
conscious effort. These results, together with the results of subjective stimulus 
ratings showing no significant valence differences, are in line with the “arousal 
hypothesis” recently proposed by Lundqvist and colleagues (Lundqvist et al., 
2014). There were equally good vMMN results in both experimental paradigms – 
oddball and optimum –, supporting the use of the optimum multi-feature 
paradigm in the future. The vMMN results did not solidly confirm a proposal 
made by Arne Öhman and colleagues (Globisch, Hamm, Esteves, & Öhman, 
1999; Öhman et al., 2001; Öhman, 2002; Schupp et al., 2004) that threatening 
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stimuli are faster and easier detected than others. However, in case of the angry 
deviant stimulus, we see that the processing negativity was earlier and was not 
dependent on the type of the standard stimulus, as was the processing of the 
happy deviant. Also, the results of the post-experimental questionnaires showed 
that the angry face that the subjects were not specifically directing their 
attention to (as it was presented in the vMMN-eliciting sequences, while the 
subjects performed a demanding target-detection task) attracted more subjective 
attention than the happy face, even almost the same as the target. This, again (as 
in Study III), demonstrates that ERPs correspond to only one aspect of an 
internal representation and that decisions about responses are not necessarily 
based on this aspect.  
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VISUAL MISMATCH NEGATIVITY- AN AUTOMATIC 
CHANGE-DETECTION MECHANISM  
The auditory MMN was discovered in 1978 by Risto Näätänen and colleagues 
(Näätänen et al., 1978). By now, it is widely used in cognitive neuroscience in 
basic research as well as in clinical populations (see Näätänen et al., 2011 and 
Näätänen et al., 2012 for reviews). Establishing the existence of a similar 
mechanism in visual modality evolved in the nineties and took some time. 
Although many researchers searched for a visual analogue of the auditory 
MMN and even claimed it existed (Cammann, 1990), most of the MMN 
community at first remained rather sceptical. The first review by Pazo-Alvarez 
and her colleagues made the existence of the vMMN plausible (Pazo-Alvarez et 
al., 2003), but as the authors of the review themselves stated 15 years ago: “In 
most cases, the authors have only checked for the emergence of the characte-
ristics of the auditory MMN without considering the peculiarities of the visual 
system”. So, several unresolved issues remained, allowing at that time to be 
sceptical concerning the final verdict on the existence of the vMMN. 
The dominating view on how changes are detected in the visual environment 
mostly emphasises the need of focal attention (for a review see Rensink, 2002). 
Phenomena such as change blindness (inability to detect changes in a scene or 
an object; Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997), attentional blink (failure to 
allocate attention to the next stimulus and perceive it in a rapid sequence, when 
the ISI between the first and the next stimuli is between 200–500 ms; Raymond, 
Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992), or inattentional blindness (failure to perceive un-
expected objects when attention is strongly focussed elsewhere; Mack & Rock, 
1998, cited in Simons, 2000; the most famously known experiment being the 
“invisible” Gorilla experiment, Simons & Chabris, 1999) seem to agree with the 
view that without visual attention, changes in the environment can escape the 
viewer’s awareness. On the other hand, even if the person is not aware of the 
change, it could still affect the processing of visual information and his/her 
(behavioural) reactions. This is evident for example from brain lesions research 
(e.g. blindsight; Sanders et al., 1974), as well as studies on priming (Tulving & 
Schacter, 1990). It would also be unreasonable to assume that we are able to 
allocate all our attentional resources to just detecting and processing all the 
changes/events in the environment, since the amount of incoming information 
via our visual system in parallel with our other senses is enormous and hap-
pening at the same time we are engaged in various activities. On the contrary – 
most of the processing of the surrounding environment and changes happening 
there goes on automatically with an ability to quickly direct one’s attention to 
events that need a reaction (orienting response, Sokolov, 1963) and a possibility 
to ignore events that do not require reacting at that particular time. One might 
say that our brain is constantly monitoring the surrounding environment and 
processing the incoming information without us even realizing that most of the 
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time. By now, this is also evident from vMMN research, which has quickly 
grown in the last decade. According to the Web of Science © (Clarivate 
Analytics) database (search conducted on December 7th, 2017), 141 publications 
(articles, reviews and editorial materials, excluding conference/meeting abstracts) 
are related to the keywords “visual mismatch negativity”, “visual MMN” or 
“vMMN” from 2008–2017; the number being only 23 before 2007 (and 
included)10, i.e. before the planning of the empirical work of Study II presented 
in this thesis began. The results of Study II and Study IV also confirm that 
vMMN emerges to sudden changes in different visual input, doing so without 
necessarily directing attention to those changes.  
There is no question whether MMN exists in visual modality anymore. 
Instead, the research and debate has moved forward to determining its un-
derlying mechanisms. There have been several views (see a thorough overview 
of these in Kimura, 2012), starting from the sensory memory trace explanation 
in oddball paradigms (first excessively supported in auditory modality, see 
Näätänen, 1992), evolving to the regularity-violation explanation (Czigler, 
2007) and abstract sequential rule violation explanation (Stefanics et al., 2011). 
What is important to note is that none of those could uniformly explain all the 
results, which has left the search for a uniform underlying mechanism open. 
Recent views on the underlying mechanisms of vMMN move more and more 
towards the agreement that the vMMN indicates the brain’s ability to predict the 
statistical regularity of events and detect disturbances in this regularity (a 
prediction-error explanation, Stefanics et al., 2014). The basis for that is 
perceptual learning (tracing back to James Gibson, e.g. Gibson & Gibson, 1955) – 
the environmental regularities (from the presentation of frequent and repeating 
standard events in the MMN paradigms) are implicitly learned and based on 
them, predictions are generated. If a rare deviant event violates a prediction, a 
prediction error occurs, which is manifested in the mismatch response. This 
process, as visual perception in general, relies on forward and backward11 
connections operating together in the hierarchical structure of the visual system 
                                                                          
10  This is just a superficial example of the difference in article quantities, not intended to 
find all the studies related to MMN in visual modality. For example, when we look at the 
studies found from the time period up to 2007 by this type of basic search, and compare the 
results with Pazo-Alvarez et al. (2003) and Czigler (2007) vMMN reviews, it is clear that 
many studies are missing from the search results. These are for example intermodal studies 
(Cammann, 1990) or studies referring to processing negativity, not vMMN (see Pazo-
Alvarez et al., 2003 Table 2).  
11  Traditionally (Maunsell & van Essen, 1983; see also the “reverse hierarchy theory” by 
Hochstein and Ahhisar, 2005) the connections from lower to higher level are termed 
„feedforward“, and the connections from higher to lower level „feedback“. Friston (2005) 
terms the connections “forward” and “backward”, respectively. As Friston (2005) argues, the 
purpose of predictive models in the brain is to generate sensory data from high-level causes, 
meaning that „forward connections provide feedback by conveying prediction error to higher 
levels“. For the clarity, term „feedback“ is not used here in the terminology of the dual 
division. 
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(Maunsell & van Essen, 1983; Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Friston, 2005). 
According to the predictive coding view, backward connections carry the infor-
mation about predictions that either match with the incoming sensory input (in 
which case the input is “explained away”) or do not match, which results in the 
prediction error.  
The predictive coding view on cortical responses (Friston, 2005) emphasises 
the role of plasticity in neural connectivity that mediates the perceptual learning 
taking place in (v)MMN generation through backward connections. More and 
more research supports the role of the NMDA (N-methyl-D-aspartate) gluta-
mate receptors in this plasticity (Coyle, Tsai, & Goff, 2003), as they are found 
mostly in the supragranual cortical layers where the mediating backward 
connections terminate, and as they are voltage-sensitive and with slow temporal 
dynamics (Friston, 2005). The NMDA receptor system functioning has been 
associated with the functioning of long-term memory, as well as working 
memory, including estimating stimulus familiarity/novelty (Javitt, Steinschneider, 
Schroeder, & Arezzo, 1996). While the empirical studies incorporated in this 
thesis do not investigate the neural underlying mechanisms of vMMN, this topic 
is of importance at least briefly to mention, when addressing the relationship 
between the vMMN and various clinical conditions. Based on drug challenge 
studies, it is suggested that the MMN deficits in the auditory modality are 
mediated mainly by the NMDA receptor hypofunction. For example, MMN 
amplitude is decreased or even abolished by NMDA receptor antagonists keta-
mine, MK-801, or PCP (phencyclidine) (see Umbricht & Krljes, 2005, 
Näätänen & Kähkönen, 2009, Näätänen et al., 2011, or Todd, Harms, Schall, & 
Michie, 2013 for reviews). NMDA receptor hypofunction is also hypothesized 
to play a role in schizophrenia, as the pharmacological NMDA antagonists 
induce sensory and cognitive deficits that resemble those seen in the disease 
(for the NMDA/glutamate hypothesis of schizophrenia, see e.g. Javitt et al., 
1996; Javitt, 2009; Javitt, Zukin, Heresco-Levy, & Umbricht, 2012). The reduced 
aMMN amplitude in schizophrenia (to especially duration and frequency 
changes) is a widespread result (Umbricht & Krljes, 2005; Näätänen & Kähkö-
nen, 2009; Damaso, Michie, & Todd, 2015). Recently, the relationship between 
glutamatergic neurotransmission and duration MMN amplitude was also shown 
without any pharmacological manipulations on healthy subjects (Kompus, 
Westerhausen, Craven, Kreegipuu, Põldver, Passow et al., 2015). In the visual 
modality, there are also reports on the role of the NMDA receptor system in 
sensory processing deficits (Javitt, 2009). Studies investigating the relationship 
between vMMN and glutamatergic neurotransmission are probably something 
we will see in the near future to help disentangle the underlying mechanisms of 
vMMN. 
By now, vMMN is also used in clinical research, and predictably more and 
more reports on that are yet to come. In addition to the fact that vMMN enables 
to study automatic visual processing without the necessary involvement of the 
subject’s focal attention, or investigate change-detection processes in case for 
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example auditory modality cannot be accessed, there are also clinical con-
ditions, where visual processing in particular is disturbed, making vMMN a 
useful tool in investigating such disturbances. Visual impairments have been 
reported in several neurodevelopmental and psychiatric disorders (Laycock et 
al., 2007). To bring out just a few examples, it has been suggested that impaired 
temporal processing in the magnocellular pathway contributes to developmental 
dyslexia (e.g. Talcott, Hansen, Willis-Owen, McKinnell, Richardson, & Stein, 
1998; Wang et al., 2010); early visual processing is impaired in schizophrenia 
(Javitt, 2009). The first comprehensive review on vMMN in clinical research 
was published in 2016 by a group of vMMN researchers, including the author 
of the current thesis.  
 
 
Study V: Visual Mismatch Negativity (vMMN): A review and  
meta-analysis of studies in psychiatric and neurological disorders 
Study V gives an overview and presents the meta-analysis of the current research 
of vMMN in clinical populations, in case of substance abuse (alcohol, nicotine, 
metamphetamine), as well as in different age groups to assess the potential chan-
ges in vMMN during maturation and ageing. The clinical conditions covered by 
the studies reviewed are: schizophrenia, mood disorders (major depressive dis-
order and bipolar disorder), neurodegenerative disorders (Alzheimer’s disease, 
mild cognitive impairment, SCA2), developmental disorders (autism, dyslexia, 
mental retardation), deafness, panic disorder, and hypertension. A very general 
conclusion from Study V is that the vMMN is altered in all those conditions 
under observation. This means either the expected vMMN reduction (as is the 
case in, for example, schizophrenia) or enhancement (as is expected, for example, 
in case of nicotine consumption, which is supposed to sharpen the primary pro-
cessing of unattended sensory input and therefore enhance cognitive perfor-
mance). Similar findings have been reported in aMMN (see Näätänen et al., 
2011, 2012). When taking a closer look at the 33 studies investigated in Study 
V, we see that there is a great methodological variety in which stimuli and in 
which paradigms have been used, how vMMN is calculated/presented, whether 
standard and deviant (or control and deviant) responses have been statistically 
compared, whether and which control groups have been used, and whether 
vMMN has been correlated to any other (clinical) measurements (e.g. test 
scores, condition severity, age). Without rewriting the entire Study V here, I 
will bring out just a couple of examples. Results regarding vMMN in mood 
disorders seem to be vague, as the statistical importance of the differential 
response between standard and deviant stimuli (i.e. the vMMN) has not been 
assessed in the papers, and there seems to be a dependency on the stimulus type. 
Also, no clear tendency can be drawn from the vMMN studies in Alzheimer’s 
disease or in aged subjects, where there are heterogeneous results. On the other 
hand, there are rather homogenous results in case of, for example, schizophrenia, 
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where patients of all four studies demonstrate smaller or no vMMN response. 
The meta-analysis of effect sizes and power conducted in Study V has pro-
mising results, as the median power calculated across 27 studies that had the 
necessary parameters presented, was 0.77 (0.61; 0.85 – the first and third 
quartiles, respectively).  
Since the time the review paper was published, there are five additional 
reports indexed in the Web of Science © (Clarivate Analytics) database (online 
search conducted on December 7th, 2017) regarding the vMMN used in clinical 
and special populations, generally in line with the heterogeneous results reported 
in Study V. A study using emotional schematic facial stimuli confirmed the 
reduced vMMN of the patients with schizophrenia compared to healthy control 
subjects (She, Li, Ning, Ren, Wu, Huang et al., 2017). Two of the studies 
investigated age-related changes in vMMN and again, as in Study V, no homo-
geneous conclusions about aging effects can be drawn. Gaál and colleagues 
showed that in some cases aging might improve the processing of deviants via 
the mechanism of longer stimulus integration time (Gaál, Bodnár, & Czigler, 
2017). The second study using numbers and letters as stimuli (Kieffaber, 
Okhravi, Hershaw, & Cunningham, 2016), showed diminished vMMN ampli-
tudes (amongst other auditory and visual ERPs) in aged compared to young 
subjects. An interesting study compared daily nicotine smokers with non-
smokers (Stothart, Maynard, Lavis, & Munafò, 2016), presenting them with the 
warning signs found on cigarette packages. The results showed no differences 
in the change detection magnitude (as indicated by the vMMN amplitude) 
between the two subject groups, although for the smokers, the vMMN latency 
was delayed. Neither were there differences in early perceptual (as indicated by 
P1) or attentional (as indicated by P3) responses, but only in higher level 
emotional processing (as revealed by the LPP that started considerably later and 
had a lower amplitude in the smoking subject group). The only other vMMN 
study investigating nicotine effects available and reported in Study V (showing 
vMMN enhancement) was that of Fisher and colleagues (Fisher, Scott, Shah, 
Prise, Thompson, & Knott, 2010), but since nicotine was acutely administered 
in the latter, the two studies cannot really be compared. Liu and colleagues (Liu, 
Xiao, & Shi, 2016) studied detection of facial expressions in adolescents. The 
adolescent group had larger fronto-central vMMN amplitudes in an early latency 
range (100–200 ms) compared to the adults. Also, early vMMN amplitudes were 
larger only in fronto-central than occipito-temporal locations in the adolescent 
group, possibly reflecting the heightened sensitivity and enhanced prefrontal 
activity to affective stimuli in adolescence. Stimulus emotional valence (happy 
or sad) was significant only in the adult group. As we argue in Study V, the 
vMMN maturates differently for separate visual functions, and it seems that for 
emotional expressions, this maturation is not complete at adolescence (the mean 
age of the group was 14.6). 
As we see in Study V, measuring the vMMN in clinical or special popu-
lations calls for more rigorous testing of different experimental protocols to 
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have a more unified understanding and agreement on methodological approaches. 
Both Study II and Study IV have improved the field in that matter. Study II is 
one of the few papers in the field where the occurrence of vMMN is investi-
gated in two different attentional settings using the same vMMN-eliciting 
stimulus sequence – a condition where the vMMN eliciting stimuli are ignored, 
as well as a condition, where attention is directed to exactly the same stimulus 
sequence. Such direct juxtapositionings are necessary to confirm that vMMN is 
independent of attention, which is one of the established prerequisites of the 
component (Näätänen et al., 2007). In addition, we propose (based on the 
results of Study I as well) to use a stimulus configuration, where the attention-
capturing target detection task is presented in the center of the visual field, 
while the vMMN-eliciting stimuli are presented in the periphery and the stimulus 
presentations are independent of each other in time. (See the Discussion pp. 7–8 
of Study II for a discussion on the significance of the target location both in 
space (i.e. different locations on the screen) and time (i.e. either in the same se-
quence with the vMMN-eliciting standard and deviant stimuli, or separate from 
the latter).) Recently, Stefanics and colleagues reviewed different experimental 
protocols used for diminishing the attention effects on the vMMN (Stefanics et 
al., 2014). The authors concluded that “even if the level of attentional control in 
vMMN studies is highly variable, the results of the various studies have been 
remarkably similar, since their overwhelming majority has reported negative-
going deviant minus standard ERP components with posterior scalp distribution 
in the ~100–400 ms range (Stefanics et al., 2014). However, as we also discuss 
in Study V (in section 2.6. Aging and maturation), the non-efficient attention 
control in some of the studies might explain the poor vMMN results. 
Study IV presents several methodological gains. Most importantly, it is the 
first study comparing the oddball and optimum paradigms in the visual domain. 
The results showed similarly solid vMMN for angry and happy faces in both 
paradigms. This is a significant encouragement for using the optimum measure-
ment paradigm, where more deviant stimuli can be presented in a shorter 
amount of time. Also, as can be seen in the vMMN literature, there are different 
ways of presenting the standard/deviant (or control/deviant) difference, i.e. what 
the vMMN is. Most commonly the vMMN waveform is a difference wave 
between (mean) deviant and standard/control stimulus activity, presenting voltage 
changes (amplitude) as a function of time. It is possible to look at the area under 
curve (AUC, e.g. Urban et al., 2008), the highest amplitude (voltage) peak in the 
(usually before chosen) expected latency range (Fisher et al., 2010), the mean 
amplitude in a certain (before determined) latency range (either choosing one 
time window around the highest peak of the vMMN curve, e.g. Astikainen et 
al., 2008; or defining several time windows, e.g. Amenedo et al., 2007), or 
oscillatory activity (Stothart & Kazanina, 2013). In Study IV, two differently 
calculated vMMN estimates (from the same data) were compared: a) maximal 
negative peak of the waveform (determined as the mean value of the peak and 
two of its neighbours); and b) mean amplitude in five time intervals, which 
38 
were determined by visual inspection of the mean waveforms, as well as the 
literature. We showed that the two estimates are very similar to each other, as 
their mean linear product-moment correlation was 0.961 (minimum 0.943, 
maximum 0.971), which at least lets us take it a bit more easy on choosing the 
“right” parameter for vMMN calculations. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The research presented in the current thesis used different behavioural and brain 
imaging methods, to target the underpinnings of automatic processing in visual 
perception. We focused on two examples of visual input that are thought to be 
processed in a rather automatic way and carry high value for a person to survive 
in the physical and social environment – motion and emotional expressions. In 
addition, we investigated the emergence of visual mismatch negativity that 
reflects the brain’s automatic change-detection ability, and showed that largely 
involuntary processes exist, which monitor visual input, categorize it, and detect 
deviations from a “standard” input. 
This thesis can be summarized by the following statements, which recapitu-
late the novelty and main findings obtained in the five presented studies: 
1. Although it is widely believed that no motion can be perceived without 
establishing a frame of reference with other objects and/or motion on the 
background, Study I demonstrated that the onset of motion is detected based 
on the retinal motion, which is not related to the context of other objects and 
motions into which the target is embedded. This finding speaks in favour of 
a simple and automatic process of detecting motion, which is largely 
insensitive to the surrounding context. 
2. Cortical electrical potentials elicited by the change in peripheral motion in 
Study II were similar irrespective of whether observers attended or not to the 
change in the motion parameters. Again, this suggests there is an automatic 
mechanism for the detection of motion, which cannot be interfered by the 
overt attention. 
3. Although observers were instructed to detect the colour change, they were 
not able to ignore the velocity with which the targets were moving in Study 
III. The fact that velocity facilitated the detection of changes in colour shows 
that processing of these two attributes – motion and colour – is not entirely 
isolated from one another. Also, it indicates that the observer can be unable 
to fully follow experimental instructions, and might rely on automatic 
mechanisms with a prefixed visual attribute instead. 
4. Participants had a predisposition to detect emotional facial expressions faster 
and more easily compared with neutral facial expressions, with a tendency 
towards more automatic attention to angry stimulus in Study IV. These 
results confirm the existence of an automatic process for analysing the 
stimulus configuration and its match to a specific combination of visual 
elements.  
5. The MMN is one of the most objective and efficient methods for analysing 
automatic processes in the brain. Well validated for the acoustic domain, a 
visual analogue of the MMN remained elusive for some time. Study II and 
Study IV contributed to proving the existence of vMMN, as well as proposed 
several methodological gains. 
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6. Recently, as a member of a group of authors, we suggested that vMMN could 
be used for the analysis of automatic processes and their alterations in the 
visual modality that can be more sensitive to various pathological changes. 
Study V is an important contribution to the vMMN field as it is the first 
comprehensive review and meta-analysis of the vMMN studies in psychiatric 
and neurological disorders. 
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EESTIKEELNE KOKKUVÕTE 
Nägemistaju automaatsete protsesside  
eksperimentaalne uurimine 
Nägemissüsteemi peamine ülesanne on anda ümbritsevast keskkonnast terviklik 
pilt, mis toetaks selles keskkonnas hakkamasaamist. Nägemisväljas on tavaliselt 
korraga palju erinevaid objekte, millel kõigil on palju erinevaid omadusi. Seega 
peab nägemissüsteem pidevalt toimetama suures infotulvas. Evolutsiooni käigus 
on välja kujunenud võime ellujäämise seisukohast olulisemat visuaalset infor-
matsiooni kiiresti märgata ja automaatselt, ilma suurema pingutuseta analüü-
sida. Seda seisukohta toetab teadmine, et aju eri osad on spetsialiseerunud eri 
omaduste (nt orientatsiooni, kuju, värvi või liikumise) töötlemisele (Livingstone 
ja Hubel, 1987, 1988). Selline spetsialiseerumine saab alguse juba silma võrk-
kestalt, kus on eri tüüpi sisendit vastu võtvad rakud, ning võrkkestalt edasi liigub 
informatsioon mitut juhteteed pidi nägemissüsteemi kõrgematesse osadesse. 
Näiteks on üks kahest suurest töötlusteest peamiselt liikumis- ja sügavusinfor-
matsiooni jaoks, teine suurem töötlustee värvi ja kuju töötlemise jaoks (Kaplan, 
2014). Automaatsete protsesside toimumist kinnitavad ka katsetulemused, mis 
on näidanud, et osa nägemisinfo töötlusest tehakse ära ilma, et vaatleja ise seda 
teadvustaks (Sanders jt, 1974). Näiteks tundub igati loogiline, et liikumisinfor-
matsiooni töödeldakse automaatsemalt kui objekti kuju või värvi, sest liikumine 
võib anda infot võimaliku ohu (looduskeskkonnas metslooma, linnakeskkonnas 
liikluses läheneva auto) kohta. Kogu nägemisväljas olevat informatsiooni ei 
suuda inimene korraga tahtlikult töödelda – eelistatult töödeldakse neid objekte, 
millele inimene parasjagu pilgu ja tähelepanu suunab (Rensink, 2002). Samas 
näitavad katsetulemused, et isegi kui inimene vaatab mõnda üksikut objekti, 
töötleb tema aju samal ajal automaatselt ka seda informatsiooni, mis jääb sellest 
objektist väljapoole, nägemisvälja perifeersematesse osadesse.  
Väitekiri keskendub nägemistaju selliste protsesside eksperimentaalsele 
uurimisele, mis on suuremal või vähemal määral automaatsed. Uurimistöös on 
kasutatud erinevaid eksperimentaalseid katseparadigmasid ja katsestiimuleid 
ning nii käitumuslikke kui ka ajukuvamismeetodeid. Esimesed kolm empiirilist 
uurimust käsitlevad liikumisinformatsiooni töötlust, mis on evolutsiooni käigus 
kujunenud üheks olulisemaks baasprotsessiks nägemistajus. Neljandas uuri-
muses on vaatluse all emotsionaalsete näoväljenduste töötlus. Väitekirja viimane 
osa tugineb ülevaateartiklile, mis käsitleb visuaalset lahknevusnegatiivsust 
psühhiaatriliste ja neuroloogiliste haiguste korral. 
Esmalt huvitas meid, kuidas vaatleja avastab liikuva objekti suunamuutusi, 
kui samal ajal toimub liikumine ka seda objekti ümbritseval taustal (Uurimus I). 
Nägemistaju uurijad on pikka aega arvanud, et liikumist arvutatakse alati mõne 
välise objekti või tausta suhtes. Kõige lihtsam näide sellisest suhtelisest liiku-
misest on indutseeritud liikumise fenomeni (Duncker, 1929) puhul tekkiv liiku-
miskontrast, mille kohaselt seisev objekt näib liikuvat vastassuunas võrreldes 
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tema vahetus läheduses liikuva teise objektiga. Oma uurimuses näitasime katses 
osalejatele ekraani keskel liikuvat eesmärkstiimulit, mille lähemas või kauge-
mas ümbruses oli ka eesmärkstiimuliga samas või vastupidises suunas liikuv 
taust. Esimeses eksperimendis palusime osalejatel reageerida võimalikult kiiresti 
nupuvajutusega, kui nad märkavad eesmärkstiimuli liikumist, ning teises eks-
perimendis palusime osalejatel kümnepunktisel skaalal hinnata, kui kiiresti 
nende arvates eesmärkstiimul liigub. Vastupidi ootustele ei kinnitanud meie 
uurimistulemused suhtelise liikumise printsiibi paikapidavust. Taustal toimuv 
liikumine, isegi vastassuunaline, mis peaks esile kutsuma liikumiskontrasti, 
mõjus alati liikumise avastamisele pigem veidi segavalt. Seda näitasid nii pike-
mad reaktsiooniajad kui ka subjektiivsed kiirusele antud hinnangud. Uurimus I 
tulemused toetavad seega pigem seisukohta, et eesmärkobjekti liikumisinfor-
matsiooni töötlus on automaatne protsess, mis tuvastab silma põhjas toimuvaid 
nihkeid, ja taustal toimuv seda eriti ei mõjuta.  
Teises uurimuses huvitas meid, kuidas töödeldakse seda informatsiooni, mis 
on inimese nägemisväljas, ent millele inimene ise tahtlikult oma tähelepanu ei 
suuna. Tajupsühholoogia valdkonnas on palju näidatud, et inimene on võimeline 
töötlema teatud osa talle esitatud informatsioonist ilma, et ta sellest ise teadlik 
oleks. Risto Näätänen avastas 1978. aastal (Näätänen jt, 1978) aju elektrilise 
aktiivsuse muutuse, mis tekib, kui kestva ühetaolise stiimulite jada (ehk standar-
dite) hulgas esitatakse üksik hälbiv stiimul (ehk deviant). Seda erinevuse 
avastamise mehhanismi ajus nimetatakse lahknevusnegatiivsuseks (ingl Mis-
match Negativity ehk MMN) ning on näidatud, et nägemismodaalsuses toimub 
selline erinevuse avastamine 150–400 millisekundi jooksul pärast muutuse 
nägemist ehk väga kiiresti. Lahknevusnegatiivsuse üks peamisi omadusi on, et 
see tekib edukalt olukordades, kus inimene töödeldavale informatsioonile ise 
otseselt tähelepanu ei pööra. Näiteks kui kuulmismodaalsuses uuritakse lahkne-
vusnegatiivsuse tekkimist vastusena helistiimulitele, lastakse katses osalejatel 
põhiülesandena samal ajal lugeda raamatut või vaadata tummfilmi, mis tõmbab 
nende tähelepanu helidelt eemale. Seega näitab lahknevusnegatiivsus auto-
maatset töötlust. Nägemismodaalsuses on tähelepanu kõrvalejuhtimine keeru-
lisem, kuna kõige parema tulemuse saamiseks peaks ka põhiülesanne olema 
visuaalne. Üks võimalikke lahendusi on esitada põhiülesanne teatud ekraani 
osas (nt keskel) ning lahknevusnegatiivsust tekitav stiimulite jada, mida katses 
osalejatel palutakse ignoreerida, mõnes teises ekraani osas. Teises uurimuses 
(Uurimus II) näitasime katses osalejatele samasugust liikuvast eesmärkstiimulist 
ja taustast koosnevat ekraanipilti nagu esimeses uurimuses. Esimeses eksperi-
mendis oli ka ülesanne sama – reageerida võimalikult kiiresti ekraani keskel 
oleva eesmärkstiimuli liikumise algusele, samal ajal taustal toimuvat liikumist 
ignoreerides. Taustal esitasime 85%-l juhtudest kestvat ühetaolist liikumist 
paremale poole, kuid 15%-l juhtudest liikus taust ootamatult vasakule poole, 
mis peaks lahknevusnegatiivsust esile kutsuma. Selleks et kontrollida tähele-
panu mõju lahknevusnegatiivsuse tekkimisele, palusime teises eksperimendis 
pöörata tähelepanu nii eesmärkstiimulile kui ka taustale ja hinnata, kas need 
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liiguvad üksteise suhtes samas või vastupidises suunas. Lisaks reaktsiooniaega-
dele mõõtsime katses osalejate aju elektrilist aktiivsust elektroentsefalograafia 
(EEG) meetodiga. EEG tulemused näitasid, et nägemissüsteem töötleb väga 
edukalt ka seda liikumisinformatsiooni, millele vaatleja teadlikult tähelepanu ei 
pööra. Taustal toimuv suunamuutus avastati ehk lahknevusnegatiivsus tekkis 
mõlemas eksperimendis – nii juhul, kui inimene oli hõivatud tähelepanu nõudva 
põhiülesandega (eksperiment 1), kui ka juhul, kui inimene suunas tähelepanu nii 
eesmärkstiimulile kui ka taustale (eksperiment 2). Huvitav on see, et esimeses 
eksperimendis, kus katses osalejatel oli palutud taustal toimuvat ignoreerida, 
toimus erinevuse avastamine ajaliselt varem. Samas ei mõjutanud taustal toi-
muva töötlemine ekraani keskel esitatud eesmärkstiimuli samaaegset töötlemist, 
mida näitasid reaktsiooniajad. See tähendab, et samal ajal, kui inimene on mõne 
tähelepanu hõlmava tegevusega ametis, suudab tema aju ümberringi toimuvaid 
sündmusi automaatselt registreerida.  
Nagu juba teises uurimuses nägime, on inimese nägemissüsteem väga hästi 
kohanenud hakkama saama olukorras, kus tavapäraselt on nägemisväljas palju 
erinevaid objekte, millel on erinevad omadused. Järgmiseks huvitas meid (Uuri-
mus III), kuidas objekti ühe omaduse (meie katses värvimuutuse) töötlemist 
mõjutab see, kui samal ajal muutub sama objekti mõni teine omadus (meie 
katses liikumiskiirus). Nägemissüsteemi ehitust ja eri osade funktsioone on 
palju uuritud ning näidatud, et eri tunnuseid töödeldakse aju eri osades ja erineva 
kiirusega (Livingstone ja Hubel, 1987). Kuigi liikumisinformatsiooni töödel-
dakse kiiresti ja automaatselt, on paljud uurijad seisukohal, et hoopis värvi-
töötlusel on ajus eelis (Moutoussis ja Zeki, 1997). Esitasime katses osalejatele 
ekraanile objekti, mis kas liikus ekraani ühest servast teise ning selle liikumise 
jooksul muutis värvi (punasest roheliseks või vastupidi) või ilmus teatud 
ekraani osas ja muutis seejärel värvi. Ülesanne oli reageerida nupuvajutusega 
võimalikult kiiresti siis, kui märgatakse värvimuutust (ehk liikumiskiirusele ei 
pidanud mingit tähelepanu pöörama). Samal ajal mõõtsime ka osalejate aju 
elektrilist aktiivsust EEG meetodiga. Näitasime, et objekti liikumine parandas 
sama objekti värvimuutuse avastamist, mis väljendus lühemates reaktsiooni-
aegades. See tulemus, mis viitab, et nende kahe omaduse töötlemine ajus ei ole 
päris eraldiseisev protsess, kordas ka meie uurimisgrupi varem avaldatud katse-
tulemusi (Kreegipuu jt, 2006). EEG tulemused näitasid et kiiremini avastatud 
värvimuutuse korral (kui objekti liikumiskiirus oli suur) olid sündmuspotent-
siaalide amplituudid madalamad, mis võib tähendada, et ülesande sooritamine 
oli nende tingimuste puhul kergem, mis väljendus väiksemas kumulatiivses aju-
aktiivsuses. Samuti näitavad kolmanda uurimuse tulemused, et hoolimata ühele 
tunnusele keskendumisest ei pruugi inimene suuta ignoreerida teist tähelepanu 
tõmbavat tunnust (liikumine), mis viitab taas kord automaatsetele töötlusprot-
sessidele.  
Esimesed kolm empiirilist uurimust käsitlesid liikumisinformatsiooni töötlust, 
mis on evolutsiooni käigus kujunenud oluline sisend. Lisaks liikumisele on aga 
veel teisigi tunnuseid, mis on ellujäämise ja keskkonnas hakkamasaamise seisu-
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kohast olulised. Neljas empiiriline uurimus keskendus emotsionaalsete näo-
väljenduste töötlusele, kuna need kannavad sotsiaalselt vajalikke signaale, mis-
tõttu on alust arvata, et nende töötlus on kujunenud suuresti automaatseks prot-
sessiks. Varasemad uurimused on näidanud, et nägude töötlus toimub ajus äär-
miselt kiiresti: juba esimese saja millisekundi jooksul toimub eristamine, kas 
tegemist on või ei ole näoga ja kas näol on positiivne või negatiivne ilme, ning 
järgmise saja millisekundi jooksul eristatakse näo identiteet (Palermo ja 
Rhodes, 2007). Sellisel varasel ajateljel toimuvate muutuste töötlust näitab väga 
edukalt juba Uurimuses II kasutatud lahknevusnegatiivsuse meetod, mida kasu-
tasime ka Uurimuses IV. Paljud uurijad on näidanud, et eelistatult (kiiremini ja 
õigemini) avastatakse neid stiimuleid, mis tekitavad hirmu, sealjuures vihaseid 
nägusid rõõmsate seas (Lundqvist, Juth ja Öhman, 2004). Vihase näo eelistööt-
luse hüpoteesi kontrollimiseks võrdlesime oma uurimuses kolme näoväljendust: 
vihast, rõõmsat ja neutraalset. Näostiimulid olid skemaatilised ehk joontest 
koosnevad, mis peaks vähendama võimalikke kõrvalmõjusid, mis võivad tekkida 
nägude vanuse ja soo või tajuliste artefaktide tõttu (Öhman jt, 2001). Neljandas 
uurimuses oli eraldi metodoloogiline eesmärk ka kahe lahknevusnegatiivsuse 
katseparadigma võrdlemine, mida polnud varem nägemistaju valdkonnas 
tehtud. Ühes neist (ingl oddball) esitasime kestva ühetaolise sisendite (ehk stan-
dardite) jada hulgas ühe hälbiva ehk deviantstiimuli (nt vihase skemaatilise näo 
neutraalsete seas). Teises katseparadigmas (optimaalne katseparadigma) esi-
tasime standardstiimulite seas mitu deviantstiimulit, mis tähendab, et lühema aja 
jooksul saab rohkemate stiimulite töötluse kohta infot koguda. Näitasime, et 
emotsiooni väljendavaid nägusid, nii vihaseid kui ka rõõmsaid, avastati kiire-
mini ja kergemini kui neutraalse ilmega nägusid ning et vihane nägu tõmbas 
rohkem subjektiivset tähelepanu kui rõõmus. Mõlemas võrreldud katsepara-
digmas tekkis näoväljenduste muutuste avastamisel ajus lahknevusnegatiivsus, 
mis lubab järeldada, et edaspidi võib nägemistaju valdkonnas optimaalset katse-
paradigmat julgemalt kasutada. 
Väitekirja viimane osa keskendus visuaalsele lahknevusnegatiivsusele (vMMN). 
Veel paarkümmend aastat tagasi polnud kindel, kas selline automaatne erine-
vuste avastamine, mida oli kuulmismodaalsuses väga palju uuritud, toimub ka 
nägemismodaalsuses. Praeguseks on selge (nagu kajastatud ka mitmes ülevaate-
artiklis, nt Pazo-Alvarez jt, 2003; Czigler, 2007; Stefanics jt, 2014), et lahk-
nevusnegatiivsus ei ole modaalsusespetsiifiline nähtus, vaid aju üldisem võime, 
mida Risto Näätänen ja tema kolleegid on nimetanud isegi primitiivseks sen-
soorseks intelligentsuseks (Näätänen jt, 2001, 2010). Uurijad on jõudnud järel-
dusele, et MMN-i (sh vMMN-i) tekkimise aluseks on ajus toimuv ennustav 
kodeerimine (Friston, 2005). See tähendab, et ajus luuakse ümbritseva kesk-
konna ja toimuvate sündmuste kohta mudel ning iga järgnevat sisendit võrrel-
dakse selle olemasoleva mudeliga. Kui sisendi ja mudeli poolt ennustatu vahel 
on erinevus, tekibki MMN/vMMN. Visuaalse MMN-i uurimisse andsid empiiri-
lise panuse nii käesoleva väitekirja Uurimus II kui ka Uurimus IV, mis mõle-
mad pakuvad välja tõendusi vMMN-i tekkimise kohta eri tingimustel ja katse-
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paradigmades ning vajalikke metodoloogilisi täiendusi. Kuulmismodaalsuses on 
lahknevusnegatiivsust uuritud väga paljudel erinevatel kliinilistel valimitel ning 
järeldatud, et lisaks sensoorse eristamise defitsiidile, tähelepanu kontrolli langu-
sele või tajuprotsesside muutumisele seostub MMN-i häirumine ka kognitiivse 
langusega laiemalt (Näätänen jt, 2011, 2012). Seega tundub MMN-i meetod 
olevat kasulik abivahend kliiniliste valimite uurimiseks, näiteks seisundi ja ravi 
efektiivsuse hindamiseks. Uurimus V on esimene kogu siiani ilmunud temaatilist 
teadustööd hõlmav ülevaateartikkel ja metaanalüüs visuaalsest lahknevusnega-
tiivsusest psühhiaatriliste ja neuroloogiliste haiguste korral, mis panustab olu-
liselt visuaalse lahknevusnegatiivsuse uurimise ja kasutamise arengusse. Lisaks 
psühhiaatrilistele ja neuroloogilistele haigustele (skisofreenia, meeleoluhäired 
(nt depressioon), paanikahäire, neurodegeneratiivsed haigused (nt Alzheimeri 
tõbi) ja psühholoogilise arengu häired (nt autism)) on Uurimuses V käsitletud 
teadustöödes uuritud lahknevusnegatiivsuse muutusi ka kõrgvererõhutõve, 
kurtuse, mõnuainete (alkohol, nikotiin ja metamfetamiin) tarvitamise korral ning 
eri vanuses inimestel. Kokku käsitles Uurimus V 33 tolleks ajaks ilmunud tea-
dustööd. Väga üldistatult võib öelda, et kõikide vaadeldud haiguste, ainete tarvi-
tamise ja ealiste iseärasuste korral toimus aju automaatses erinevuse avastamise 
võimes muutus. See muutus võis olla negatiivne ja väljenduda vMMN-i ampli-
tuudi vähenemises, nagu näiteks skisofreenia või vananemise korral, kuid teatud 
juhtudel oli muutus ka vastupidises suunas, näiteks nikotiin suurendas vMMN-i 
amplituudi. Teadusartiklite metaanalüüs näitas, et uurimuste statistiline me-
diaanvõimsus oli 0.77, mis on oluliselt kõrgem, kui neuroteaduse valdkonnas on 
muidu leitud. Uurimuse V põhjal võib öelda, et ka visuaalses modaalsuses on 
lahknevusnegatiivsusel suur potentsiaal kliiniliste valimite uurimisel, mille 
üheks eelduseks on katseparadigmade ja kasutatava stiimulmaterjali suurem 
ühtlustamine. 
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